Question 2. [20 points] Consider Stackelberg's duopoly game in the case that the inverse demand function...

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Question 2. [20 points] Consider Stackelberg's duopoly game in the case that the inverse demand function is defined by P(Q) = a - Q for Q < a (and P(Q) = 0 if Q > a) and the cost function of firm i is C(q.) = ciq; with 0 < i<a and 0 < c2<a. 1. [8 points] Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. Be sure to specify the firms' equilibrium strategies. 2. [4 points] How much output does each firm produce in the subgame perfect equilibrium? 3. [8 points] Does the extensive game have a Nash equilibrium in which firm l's output is zero? If it does, fully describe the firms' equilibrium strategies in this equilibrium. If it does not, argue why not. Question 2. [20 points] Consider Stackelberg's duopoly game in the case that the inverse demand function is defined by P(Q) = a - Q for Q < a (and P(Q) = 0 if Q > a) and the cost function of firm i is C(q.) = ciq; with 0 < i<a and 0 < c2<a. 1. [8 points] Find the subgame perfect equilibrium. Be sure to specify the firms' equilibrium strategies. 2. [4 points] How much output does each firm produce in the subgame perfect equilibrium? 3. [8 points] Does the extensive game have a Nash equilibrium in which firm l's output is zero? If it does, fully describe the firms' equilibrium strategies in this equilibrium. If it does not, argue why not.