QUESTION 2 Consider each player's best response function. What is Player 1's best response when Player 2 chooses to get the shot? Get the shot. Not get the shot. Both get the shot and not get the shot. . Neither get the shot or get the shot. QUESTION 3 Consider each player's best response function. What is Player 1's best response when Player 2 chooses to not get the shot? Get the shot. Not get the shot. Both get the shot and not get the shot. Neither get the shot or get the shot. QUESTION 4 What are the Nash equilibria in this game? Both (P1=Shot, P2=Shot) and (P1=No shot, P2=No shot) Only (P1=Shot, P2=No shot) Both (P1=Shot, P2=No shot) and (P1=No shot, P2=shot) Only (P1=No shot, P2=shot) QUESTION 5 Which statement best describes the implications of the Nash equilibria in this game? Nobody will get shots, and society will be better off. . Everybody will get shots, and society will be better off. Everybody will get shots, and society will be worse off. Some people will get shots, while others don't, because of a "free rider effect". QUESTION 6 Consider the game in Question 2. For which values of e is the strategy profile (Player 1=B, Player 2=B) the only Nash equilibrium? . All e less than 4. . All e greater than 4 No solution exists. All possible values of e.QUESTION 1 Consider the flu shot game. Write the game in payoff matrix/table form. Player 2 No Shot Shot No Shot -S, -S S, S-K Player 1 Shot S-K, S S-K, S-K Player 2 No Shot Shot No Shot S-K, S-K S, S-K Player 1 Shot S-K, S -S, -S Player 2 No Shot Shot No Shot -S, -S S-K, S Player 1 Shot S, S-K S-K, S-K Player 2 No Shot Shot No Shot S-K, S-K S-K, S Player 1 Shot S, S-K -S, -S