Question 2. Consider the above game {question 1) but suppose that the decision to enter by the competitor is reversible in the following sense: after it has entered, and after the monopolist has chosen to accommodate or fight, the competitor can choose to remain in the industry {and receive either the $5M profits or $5M loss} or to exit. Suppose that exiting at this point results in a loss to the entrant of $1M, and the monopolist regains its $10M profit. The new game is represented by the following tree. I: .'j HIPEEHOI im] m n or;- o l 1 st 5,5 4,10 4,10 -5,-5 What is the Nash equilibrium lsubgame perfect Nash equilibrium) of the above game? {In1.|n2,ln3; Accommodate} a. b. c. {Out1,0ut2.0ut3; Fight} d