Question 2. Consider the following two player game: L c R U 2,0 mm mm 313 m D o,2m2,1 (a) Compute the Nash equilibrium (it is in mixed strategies). (b) If the game is repeated twice, is there a SPE where (MO) is played in the first round? Explain. For (c) and (d) below, assume that the game is repeated infinitely many times, and that both players\" discount factor is 6. As usual, payoffs are given by the discounted sum of payoffs at each round. Players are allowed to choose randomized actions, and players are able to observe past randomizations. (c) Show that there is a SPE that induces play of (MC) at each round when 6 is large enough. Fully describe the strategies of the players in this SPE. (d) Show that there is a SPE where the discounted average payoffs are 5,5 when 6 is large enough. Fully describe the strategies of the players in this SPE. State the Folk Theorem and use the SPE you just found to explain it