Question 2. Here's a variation on the infinite period bargaining problem we have seen. There are still only two players and they share a dollar. However, player 1 is the one who makes an offer in every period (as opposed to alternating between who makes the offer). So player 1 makes an offer in every period t = 1, 2, ... of my E [0, 1] to player 2. If player 2 accepts the offer, the game ends and if she rejects it, the game proceeds to period t + 1 and player 1 again makes an offer. The players both have the same discount factor o E (0, 1] so that they payoff to the offer m, being accepted in period t is of-1(1 - mt) for player 1 and of-1 m, for player 2. 1. Define a Nash equilibrium where player 1 offers g to player 2 in the first period. 2. Show that the equilibrium you found in part 1 is not subgame perfect when 8