Question 28 (1 point) Consider the following entry game: Here, firm B is an existing firm in the market, and firm A is a potential entrant. Firm A must decide whether to enter the market (play 'enter") or stay out of the market (play "not enter"). If firm A decides to enter the market, firm B must decide whether to engage in a price war (play "hard"), or not (play "soft"). By playing "hard," firm B ensures that firm A makes a loss of $2 million, but firm B only makes $2 million in profits. On the other hand, if firm B plays "soft," the new entrant takes half of the market, and each firm earns profits of $4 million. If firm A stays out, it earns zero while firm B earns $8 million. Which of the following are Nash equilibrium strategies? (enter, hard) and (not enter, soft) (not enter, hard) and (enter, soft) (enter, soft) and (not enter, soft) (enter, hard) and (not enter, hard) Activate Windows