Question: Question 4 1 pts Consider the following game Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 2, -12 -1, 1 Down -1, 1 14, -1 This

 Question 4 1 pts Consider the following game Player 2 LeftRight Player 1 Up 2, -12 -1, 1 Down -1, 1 14,

Question 4 1 pts Consider the following game Player 2 Left Right Player 1 Up 2, -12 -1, 1 Down -1, 1 14, -1 This game has [ Select ] pure-strategy Nash equilibrium/ia and [ Select ] mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium/ia.Question 5 1 pts (Continue) In the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium, let p denote Pr(Up) and q denote Pr(Left). P = q = For marking purpose: - If your answer is a fraction, please round it to three decimal places (for example, write 0.333 if your answer is 1/3). - If this game does not have any mixed strategy NE, please enter p = 99 and q = 99 as your answer. - If this game has more than one mixed strategy NE, please enter p = 100 and q = 100 as your

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