Question: Question 4 7.5 points Save Answer (ii) $450 If you are long 2 contracts on 1-year TSLA call option with strike price of $450, what

Question 4 7.5 points Save Answer (ii) $450 "If you are

Question 4 7.5 points Save Answer (ii) $450 "If you are long 2 contracts on 1-year TSLA call option with strike price of $450, what will be your payoff at expiry if the TSLA price at that time is (i) $200 and (iii) $1000 . 1 contract is 100 shares. Answer in integers." A Moving to another question will save this response. >>

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