Question 6 (2 points) Consider a situation where a principal hires an agent who may be "good" or "bad". Not being able to identify the type of the agent. she must design two contracts (WG, eG) and (WB, e B) stipulating an effort level (e) and an associated wage (w). The utility of the agent is given by U = w - Be where B = 2 for the "good" type and B = 4 for the "bad" type. The agent's reservation utility is equal to 120. Which of the following are the correct incentive constraints that the contracts must satisfy? Ow - 4(e_)2 2 120 WG - 2(eG) > WB - 2(eB) OwG -2(ec)2 2 120 WB - 4(en) 2 WG -4(ec)"Question 6 (2 points) Consider a situation where a principal hires an agent who may be "good" or "bad". Not being able to identify the type of the agent. she must design two contracts (WG, eG) and (WB, e B) stipulating an effort level (e) and an associated wage (w). The utility of the agent is given by U = w - Be where B = 2 for the "good" type and B = 4 for the "bad" type. The agent's reservation utility is equal to 120. Which of the following are the correct incentive constraints that the contracts must satisfy? Ow - 4(e_)2 2 120 WG - 2(eG) > WB - 2(eB) OwG -2(ec)2 2 120 WB - 4(en) 2 WG -4(ec)&quot