Question 7 (16 points). Suppose there are two players in a game below. For each pair of payoff numbers, the first number is the payoff of Player R and the second number is the payoff of Player C. Player C 0-100 0-150 Player R 0-50 37. 37 $30. 40 20, 37 0=100 40, 30 32. 32 15, 25 0 150 $ 37. 20 4 25. 15 0. 0 a. (6 points) Given that the players move simultaneously, I. Identify any dominant strategies in this game and explain. (2 points) II. Find any Nash equilibrium and explain why it is a Nash equilibrium. (4 points) b. (10 points) Now suppose the firms move sequentially, with Player R moving first. I. Draw a game tree. (3 points) II. Identify any subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in this sequential move game. Explain why it is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. (7 points)