Question 9 Consider the following signalling game between a worker (who can be of two types: good and bad) and an employer. The first payoff listed is the payoff to the worker and the second payoff is the payoff to the employer. Not yet answered Marked out of 20,5 h h 10,5 2.00 no uni Good worker uni Flag question 6.0 n n -4.0 1/5 Employer Nature Employer - - - - - 4/5 20,-5 h 5, -5 h no uni Bad worker uni 4,0 n n -11, 0 Is there a pooling equilibrium in this game in which no workers go to uni? Select one: O a. No O b. Yes, and the employer hires everyone O c. Yes, and the employer hires no one O d. Yes, and the employer hires only the educated