Question :

Consider a standard dictator game in which the total amount of money available is $11]. Suppose that the dictator allocates il to herself and ii} to the recipient. She may be: a. Possibly Rawlsian, utilitarian, DR selsh b Selsh c. Possibly Rawlsian 0R selfish do utilitarian e. Possibly Selfish DR utilitarian f. Possibly Rawlsian 0R utilitarian g. A Rawlsian t Boat '1 prisoners' dilemma with the following payoffs [identical to the fisherman example we discussed in detail in class]. Suppose the game is played by mo people who are entirely selsh [i.e., their only goal in the game is to maximize their own payout - they don't care how much the other person gets). Both are very good at thinking ahead...They will play a total of 5 rounds of the game. They can communicate all they wish but they make their decision of whether to cooperate or defect. At the end of each round, each person has the opportunity to pay 1 point in order to deduct 15 points from the other person's payoff. What do you predict will be subjects' total payoffs; a. 5D each h. 25 each c. it is impossible to discern based on the available information {1 4-5 each Consider a 5-round prisoners' dilemma. with the same structure as in the previous question. Suppose that you yourself are entirely selfish, but you are fairly certain you are paired with someone who might be described as a "strong conditional cooperator": she will always cooperate, unless she sees that her counterparty has failed to cooperate. in which case she will denitely defect from that point onward. How much can you get in total points over the course of this game: a. 25 points b. 5n points {2. i need more information to answer the question {1 55 points .2. on points