Question e) i have some difficulties understanding

2. There are two types of consumers. Type 1 consumers have demand for your good equal to (1109) = 10 10, while type 2 consumers have demand for your good equal to qz (p) = 20 2p. Your marginal cost of production is constant; m = 5. a. b. c. If all consumers were of type 1, what would be the optimal two-part tariff? If all consumers were of type 2, what would be the optimal two-part tariff? If there were consumers of both types and you charged the tariff from part a, would type 2 consumers choose to buy the good? If there were consumers of both types and you charged the tariff from part b, would type 1 consumers choose to buy the good? Using what you found in the previous four parts, if the market is comprised of 50 percent type 1 consumers and 50 percent type two consumers, what is your profit from each of the tariffs derived in parts a and b? Suppose you offered the two-part ta riff (T, p) = (7,625) . How much would each type of consumer buy? What would be your prot? Suppose that the following two two-part tariffs were offered: (T1491) = (3, 7.5) and (T2,p2) = (21, 5). Which two-part tariff would each type of consumer choose to buy from? What would be the total profit