R DAILY QUESTION SE This question is about bargaining models. The first is an ultimatum game, the second is Nash cooperative SE Players and owners are negotiating over how to split team revenue. The players go frst, suggesting a split of $100. If the owners reject, there is only $70 left, so they propose a split of the $70. If the players reject there is only $40 left, so the players propose a split of the $40. If the owner reject this last offer, both will end up with just $5. How much does each side get in equilibrium? SE SE SE AU R DAILY QUESTION SE This question is about bargaining models. The first is an ultimatum game, the second is Nash cooperative SE Players and owners are negotiating over how to split team revenue. The players go frst, suggesting a split of $100. If the owners reject, there is only $70 left, so they propose a split of the $70. If the players reject there is only $40 left, so the players propose a split of the $40. If the owner reject this last offer, both will end up with just $5. How much does each side get in equilibrium? SE SE SE AU