S Cohsider a one-population evolution model based on the given game. (a) Compute the population at time t+1 if the population at time t is (b) Identify all pure strategy ESS, if any exist. (c) Graph the population space divided into regions where A pays or worse (1/5, 1/5, 3/5) and base fitness is 2. better than B, A pays better or worse than C, and B pays better of wor than C Find all mixed strategy evolutionary equilibria, plot them in your graph form part (c), and determine their stability using information from part (c) (d) ABC 3 3 Al B 2 3 2 4 S Cohsider a one-population evolution model based on the given game. (a) Compute the population at time t+1 if the population at time t is (b) Identify all pure strategy ESS, if any exist. (c) Graph the population space divided into regions where A pays or worse (1/5, 1/5, 3/5) and base fitness is 2. better than B, A pays better or worse than C, and B pays better of wor than C Find all mixed strategy evolutionary equilibria, plot them in your graph form part (c), and determine their stability using information from part (c) (d) ABC 3 3 Al B 2 3 2 4