show workings. and draw game tree.

Question 2. Entry Game. Consider the following entry game: There are two periods: Firm I is in the market for both periods, and Firm E decides to enter or not in the second period. Market demand is P=140Q. Each firm has fixed costs of $1200 and marginal cost MC=$20. Suppose in period 1,I has two strategies: set the price at Pm=$80 (monopoly price), or at Pl=$40 (limit price). After seeing the price set by I in the first period, E decides to enter the market or not (In or Out). If E chooses Out, then I selects Pm in the second period. If E chooses In, then I as a price leader can decide whether the market price is Pl or Pc=60 (Cournot price), and demand is shared equally between the two firms. Draw a game tree and find the SPNE of the game. Question 2. Entry Game. Consider the following entry game: There are two periods: Firm I is in the market for both periods, and Firm E decides to enter or not in the second period. Market demand is P=140Q. Each firm has fixed costs of $1200 and marginal cost MC=$20. Suppose in period 1,I has two strategies: set the price at Pm=$80 (monopoly price), or at Pl=$40 (limit price). After seeing the price set by I in the first period, E decides to enter the market or not (In or Out). If E chooses Out, then I selects Pm in the second period. If E chooses In, then I as a price leader can decide whether the market price is Pl or Pc=60 (Cournot price), and demand is shared equally between the two firms. Draw a game tree and find the SPNE of the game