solve the problem 5 Please Thank you so much

1. (20 points) Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce in competitive markets. Firm l's output generates a negative externality on Firm 2. The price of Firm l's product is R1 = 30 and Firm l's cost function is C (Q.) = 20 + 4. The price of Firm 2's product is P2 = 60 and Firm 2's cost function is C2(Q1,Q2)) = 2Q3 +Q1Q2 + 16. Perform the computations to fill in the blank cells in the table below on the answer sheet and fill in cells of the copy of the table that is on the answer sheet. 1 P1 = 30, P2 = 60 Q.Q2 | Profit 1 Profit 2 Total Merged firms No Property Rights Firm 1 Shut Down P1 = 30, P2 = 60 Q1 Q2 Profit 1 Profit 2 Total Merged firms 4 14 84 376 84 376 460 No Property Rights 17.513.125108.5 328.53 437.03 o 115 - 4 434 430 Firm 1 Shut Down 5. If Pi = 30 and P2 = 30 for the example considered in Problem 1, the following table results. P = 30, P2 = 30 Q Q2 Profit 1 Profit 2 Total 104 56 160 7.5 5.63 108.5 47.28 155.78 0 7.5 0 96.5 96.5 Optimal (merge firms) No Property Rights Firm 1 Shut Down Property Rights Polluter Pays Victim Pays (a) (5 points) Fill in the last two rows of the table. (b) (5 points) What is the deadweight loss due to the externality? 1. (20 points) Firm 1 and Firm 2 produce in competitive markets. Firm l's output generates a negative externality on Firm 2. The price of Firm l's product is R1 = 30 and Firm l's cost function is C (Q.) = 20 + 4. The price of Firm 2's product is P2 = 60 and Firm 2's cost function is C2(Q1,Q2)) = 2Q3 +Q1Q2 + 16. Perform the computations to fill in the blank cells in the table below on the answer sheet and fill in cells of the copy of the table that is on the answer sheet. 1 P1 = 30, P2 = 60 Q.Q2 | Profit 1 Profit 2 Total Merged firms No Property Rights Firm 1 Shut Down P1 = 30, P2 = 60 Q1 Q2 Profit 1 Profit 2 Total Merged firms 4 14 84 376 84 376 460 No Property Rights 17.513.125108.5 328.53 437.03 o 115 - 4 434 430 Firm 1 Shut Down 5. If Pi = 30 and P2 = 30 for the example considered in Problem 1, the following table results. P = 30, P2 = 30 Q Q2 Profit 1 Profit 2 Total 104 56 160 7.5 5.63 108.5 47.28 155.78 0 7.5 0 96.5 96.5 Optimal (merge firms) No Property Rights Firm 1 Shut Down Property Rights Polluter Pays Victim Pays (a) (5 points) Fill in the last two rows of the table. (b) (5 points) What is the deadweight loss due to the externality