Stakeholder case study $-$ Software cannot change behaviour $$ UK offender management system

This failed IT system for tracking criminals is a case study in poor stakeholder and project management. The UK National

Offender Management Information System project failed due to shocking mismanagement. This failed IT system for tracking

criminals is a case study in poor Stakeholder and project management. The UK National Offender Management Information

System project failed due to shocking mismanagement.

In June $2004,$ the newly$-$created National Offender Management Service $($NOMS$),$ then part of the Home Office now within

the Ministry of Justice, initiated an Information System project $($C$-$NOMIS$)$ to implement a single offender management IT

system across both the prison and probation services.

The problem was that some people yo$-$yoed between jail and probation and moved around the country so the regional

systems for keeping track of them failed to work well enough. C$-$NOMIS was intended to support a new way of working,

known as $$end$-$to$-$end offender management$.$ Under end$-$to$-$end offender management, each offender is supervised by a

single offender manager throughout their sentence, whether it is served in custody or in the community.

The National Offender Management System team $($NOMS$)$ underestimated the need to invest in business change alongside

the IT system. There are $42$ probation areas in England and Wales, each with their own ways of working. NOMS, however,

made no sustained effort to simplify and standardise business processes across prisons and probation areas, and did not

allocate resource for this purpose. At the outset, NOMS treated C$-$NOMIS as an IT project rather than a major IT$-$enabled

business change programme. This status increased the pressure on the project team to approve requests for changes and

contributed to significant scope creep. In other words, the people who were to become the users of the new system, the key

stakeholders, were facing a new IT system being dumped on them without any understanding of their way of working.

The likelihood of the new IT systems fitting in the way the local probation area happened to work were like buses and bus

timetables: coincidental at best. Not only were the probation people expected to work or change the way they work but they

were also expected to have a much closer relationship with the local prison management. Many of the $42$ local probation

areas just sailed on regardless paying little or no interest in the programme. Meanwhile the budget grew. Another key group

of stakeholders were the suppliers. The NAO report makes it clear that contractual arrangements with its key suppliers were

weak and its supplier management poor. Instead of tendering key project contracts, NOMS opted to use its current suppliers

under existing framework agreements to develop and deliver the C$-$NOMIS application. NOMS allowed these contracts to go

forward on a time and materials basis for longer than it should, which meant that there was insufficient pressure on

suppliers to deliver to time and cost.

In addition, NOMS$$ relationship with its suppliers, particularly EDS $($now DXC$.$technology$),$ deteriorated and it did not make

best use of their expertise. Significantly, NOMS did not seek to revise its contractual arrangements with Syscon, the

software developers, immediately the extent of the customization became clear. Engagement with stakeholders was on an

ad hoc basis. Early on$,$ users were given the chance to voice their opinions of the C$-$NOMIS application and user groups

were involved in development of the system requirements. There was little communication with stakeholders on project

progress. With project plans failing to schedule engagement activities, many stakeholders were unsure how best to

communicate with the project. When delays occurred, many stakeholders only found out at the last minute, $($NAO$,2009).$

The programme was re$-$scoped, a euphemism for thinking again. Or perhaps thinking for the first time. This tale is not one

of total loss as the NAO does recognise that we do have a better system today than we had. In its summary the NAO said,

$$Overall the C$-$NOMIS project was handled badly and the value for money achieved by the project was poor$,($NAO$,2009).$