Suppose Motorola and Lucent Technologies are trying to decide whether to develop in$-$house or license proprietary trade secrets in telecommunications engineering and software. The following table shows their payoffs in this simultaneous$-$play repeated game.

$\backslash$table$[[$Lucent$,,$Motorola$],[,$Develop$/$Patent$,$Imitate$/$License$],[$Develop$/$Patent$,$$$5$ B$,$ $$1$ B$,$$$4$B$,$ S$3$B$],[$Imitate$/$License$,$$$9$ B$,$ $$1$ B$,$$$0$ B$,$ S$2$ B$]]$

Which of the following is a Nash equibrium strategy? Check all that apply.

$\{\begin{array}{c}?\end{array}$ Develop ${?}_{\text{L}\text{u}\text{a}\text{r}\text{n}\text{t}},$ License $\{$:${?}_{\text{M}\text{o}\text{t}\text{o}\text{r}\text{d}\text{a}}\}$

$\{$License Lument, License Matorola $\}$

$\{$Developlucent$,$ Develop $\{$:${?}_{\text{M}\text{o}\text{t}\text{o}\text{r}\text{o}\text{l}\text{a}}\}$

$\{\begin{array}{c}?\end{array}$ License ${?}_{\text{I}\text{u}\text{m}\text{i}\text{t}},$ Develop $\{$:${?}_{\text{M}\text{o}\text{t}\text{o}\text{r}\text{o}\text{l}\text{a}}\}$