Suppose player I knows there exists a probability distribution over states with some unknown value p,...

 

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Suppose player I knows there exists a probability distribution over states with some unknown value p, and player 2 knows which state is going to be realized. Good (p) A Player 1 B Player 2 D (2.1) (0,0) C (0,0) (1.2) A B Bad (1-P) C Player 2 D (0,2) (2.0) (0.1) (1,0) a. What are the possible pure strategy BNES? b. Define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and explain why what you just found qualifies. Suppose player I knows there exists a probability distribution over states with some unknown value p, and player 2 knows which state is going to be realized. Good (p) A Player 1 B Player 2 D (2.1) (0,0) C (0,0) (1.2) A B Bad (1-P) C Player 2 D (0,2) (2.0) (0.1) (1,0) a. What are the possible pure strategy BNES? b. Define a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and explain why what you just found qualifies.