Suppose Pole Position only had one Hard$-$Core driver and no Just$-$For$-$Fun drivers.

a$)$ What price per lap would maximize its profit?

b$)$ At this price, how many laps would a Hard$-$Core driver purchase?

c$)$ How much profit would Pole Position earn from these sales?

Suppose Pole Position only had one Just$-$For$-$Fun driver and no Hard$-$Core driver.

a$)$ What price per lap would maximize its profit?

b$)$ At this price, how many laps would a Just$-$For$-$Fun driver purchase?

c$)$ How much profit would Pole Position earn from these sales?

Suppose Pole Position could perfectly distinguish between the two segments. Thus, when a

Hard$-$Core driver approached, she would be charged the price you found in $2$a and when a

Just$-$For$-$Fun driver approached, he would be charged the price you found in $3$a$).$

a$)$ What would be the total profit earned by selling to both types? Hint: Just add your

answers to $2c$ and $3c.$

b$)$ Briefly explain why such a pricing strategy is unlikely to be feasible in practice.

Suppose Pole Position had to set the price per lap the same regardless of the type of customer.