Suppose the following game is repeated once (that is, played twice in total). Bridget Alex SB...

 

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Suppose the following game is repeated once (that is, played twice in total). Bridget Alex SB (40,40) (70,20) SA SA (20, 70) (30,30) (a) How many strategies does Alex have? (b) In an SPNE, what actions will Alex and Bridget play the second time the game is played, if they played (SA, SB) in the first iteration of the game? Same question if they played (s', $B). Explain why. (c) Suppose they are about to play the game for the first time, and that they anticipate the outcome in the second round to be (30,30) (associated to (s4, S)) independently of which action they are about to play. Represent this situation as a strategic-form game. What is its NE? Suppose the following game is repeated once (that is, played twice in total). Bridget Alex SB (40,40) (70,20) SA SA (20, 70) (30,30) (a) How many strategies does Alex have? (b) In an SPNE, what actions will Alex and Bridget play the second time the game is played, if they played (SA, SB) in the first iteration of the game? Same question if they played (s', $B). Explain why. (c) Suppose they are about to play the game for the first time, and that they anticipate the outcome in the second round to be (30,30) (associated to (s4, S)) independently of which action they are about to play. Represent this situation as a strategic-form game. What is its NE?

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a Alex has two strategies sA and sA b In a Sequential Perfect Nash Equilibrium SPNE the actions that ... View the full answer