Table A shows the pricing options for two drone operators, Andrew and Jasmine, as an oligopoly in a local market. Which of the following pricing strategy scenarios does Table 2 depict, when there are at least two pricing periods expected?

Table A	Drone Operator Andrew LOW Price	Drone Operator Andrew HIGH Price
Drone Operator Jasmine LOW Price	Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $1,000 profit	Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit
Drone Operator Jasmine HIGH Price	Drone Operator Andrew Charges LOW Price: gets $2,000 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $0 profit	Drone Operator Andrew Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit Drone Operator Jasmine Charges HIGH Price: gets $1,500 profit

Table 2 Pricing Strategy Scenario

TABLE 2	First Period Price Choice (High or Low)	First Period Profit	Second Period Price Choice (High or Low)	Second Period Profit	Total Profit for both periods
Andrew	Low	$1,000	Low	$1,000	$2,000
Jasmine	Low	$1,000	Low	$1,000	$2,000

a. Andrew plays Tit-for-Tat and Jasmine plays Tit-for-Tat.

b. Andrew plays Tit-for-Tat and Jasmine "cheats."

c. Jasmine "cheats" and Andrew "cheats."

d. Jasmine plays Tit-for-Tat and Andrew "cheats."

e. Expecting only one pricing period, Jasmine chooses the Nash Non-cooperative Equilibrium price strategy.