The Bradley Fighting Vehicle, a fixture of the U.S. Army's inventory, has been in service since 1981. It has been used in combat in the 1991 Gulf War, in Somalia in 1998, in Bosnia in 1999 and in Afghanistan in 2001. Although it has been deployed reasonably successfully in combat, the case of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) is an example of a project whose original scope was altered so greatly that the project finally achieved a life of its own, seemingly divorced from its original goals. An armoured personnel carrier (APC) is a large tracked vehicle with minimal offensive firepower. Its job is to take troops riding inside into battle areas as quickly as possible. In combat the APC works with other armoured vehicles to develop and exploit breakthroughs on the battlefield. The Bradley, manufactured by FMC Corporation was conceived and designed in the early 1960s to replace the army's M113 APC. Original specifications of the Bradley design included: 1. The capability to transport the entire infantry squad (12 soldiers) 2. A top speed to keep paced with other armoured vehicles 3. Strong side armour to protect the crew and infantry riding in the vehicle 4. The ability to travel through water and 5. Minimal offensive firepower to travel light Although the initial plans suggest a fast turnaround for the project, almost two decades later the Army received a vehicle: 1. that could transport only six personnel 2. Was so lightly armoured that enemy weaponry could easily penetrate its sides 3. Sank like a stone when attempting to cross rivers and 4. Carried a hefty full component of machine guns, a 25mm cannon and anti-tank missiles. Its realisation was completely out of proportion to the role on the battlefield originally conceived for it. What went wrong? Perhaps the biggest problem that hampered the development of the Bradley almost from the beginning was the failure of the army to come to a definitive agreement on the role the Bradley was to play on the modern battlefield. As mentioned earlier, the army began simply with the need to replace its older APC, Army brass designed it to be deployed against Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. However, they quickly added another requirement: that the Bradley serve in the dual role of armoured scout. These two missiles were not compatible. Heavy armour, large size and weaponry only for defensive purposes were the qualities that defined an APC. An armoured scout needed to trade armour plating for extra speed. Further a scout's mission was also more offensive, requiring that the vehicle be outfitted with a full complement of weapons, including a turret with cannon, machine gun, and anti-tank missiles. The army's lack of clarity for the Bradley's basic mission doomed it to serve poorly in both roles. It also dramatically lengthened the development cycle. Redesign followed redesign and modification followed modification, rapidly consuming the budget and stretching development out through the administration of five US presidents. Once put into production at FMC Corporation, the Bradley was also plagued by poor quality control. Employee whistleblower Henry Boisvert and others routinely witnessed sham testing, falsified documents, and poor quality control on the assembly lines. Army tests were no better conducted as the Air Force officer in charge of operational testing and evaluation, Colonel Burton, discovered. Some live fire tests were rigged and some results were fabricated. In order to maintain an

acceptable top speed, the Bradley sacrificed standard armour plating in favour of a form of aluminium that burned easily while giving off deadly fumes. Further to support the weapon complement necessary for the vehicle to serve as an armoured scout, the interior of the vehicle was much smaller. Since 1981 when the Bradley originally rolled off the assembly line, more than 6700 have been put into service by the US Army. From the outset, the vehicle has faced a mixed reception. Advocates argue that it serves a useful role in the modern, highly mobile army. Critics point out that as a result of its poor initial project scope and the Army's willingness to make numerous dramatic changes to the role of the Bradley midway through development, the army was left with a dangerous lemon. All of this cost the army over $14 billion. Source: Pinto (2019)

QUESTION

When is scope creep useful and when is it dangerous? Under what circumstances should an organization refuse to freeze project design specifications for valid reasons? Relate your response to the case study.