Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, brought this class action to enjoin respondent from denying them
Question:
Petitioners, Negro residents of Little Rock, Arkansas, brought this class action to enjoin respondent from denying them admission to a recreational facility called Lake Nixon Club owned and operated by respondent, Euell Paul, and his wife. The complaint alleged that Lake Nixon Club was a “public accommodation” subject to … the Civil Rights Act of 1964 … and that respondent violated the act in refusing petitioners admission solely on racial grounds. After trial, the District
Court, although finding that respondent had refused petitioners admission solely because they were Negroes, dismissed the complaint on the ground that Lake Nixon Club was not within any of the [enumerated] “public accommodations” covered by the 1964 Act… .
Lake Nixon Club, located 12 miles west of Little Rock, is a 232-acre amusement area with swimming, boating, sunbathing, picnicking, miniature golf, dancing facilities, and a snack bar. The Pauls purchased the Lake Nixon site in 1962 and subsequently operated this amusement business there in a racially segregated manner.
… [T]he Civil Rights Act of 1964 enacted a sweeping prohibition of discrimination or segregation on the ground of race, color, religion, or national origin at places of public accommodation whose operations affect commerce. This prohibition does not extend to discrimination or segregation at private clubs. But, as both courts below properly found, Lake Nixon is not a private club. It is simply a business operated for a profit with none of the attributes of self- government and member-ownership traditionally associated with private clubs.
It is true that following enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Pauls began to refer to the establishment as a private club. They even began to require patrons to pay a 25-cent “membership” fee, which gains a purchaser a “membership” card entitling him to enter the Club’s premises for an entire season and, on payment of specified additional fees, to use the swimming, boating, and miniature golf facilities.
But this "membership” device seems no more than a subterfuge designed to avoid coverage of the 1964 Act. White persons are routinely provided “membership” cards, and some 100,000 whites visit the establishment each season. Negroes, on the other hand, are uniformly denied “membership” cards, and thus admission, because of the Pauls’ fear that integration would “ruin the business". The conclusion of the courts below that Lake Nixon is not a private club is plainly correct—indeed, respondent does not challenge that conclusion here.
We, therefore, turn to the question whether Lake Nixon Club is “a place of public accommodation” as defined by … the 1964 Act, and, if so, whether its operations “affect commerce” within the meaning of… that Act.
Petitioners argue first that Lake Nixon’s snack bar is a covered public accommodation … and that as such it brings the entire establishment within the coverage… . Clearly, the snack bar is “principally engaged in selling food for consumption on the premises.” Thus, it is a covered public accommodation if “It serves or offers to serve interstate travelers or a substantial portion of the food which it serves … has moved in commerce.” We find that the snack bar is a covered public accommodation under either of these standards.
The Pauls advertise the Lake Nixon Club in a monthly magazine called “Little Rock Today,” which is distributed to guests at Little Rock hotels, motels, and restaurants, to acquaint them with available tourist attractions in the area. Regular advertisements for Lake Nixon were also broadcast over two area radio stations. In addition, Lake Nixon has advertised in the “Little Rock Air Force Base,” a monthly newspaper. This choice of advertising media leaves no doubt that the Pauls were seeking broad-based patronage from an audience which they knew to include interstate travelers. Thus, the Lake Nixon Club unquestionably offered to serve out-of-state visitors to the Little Rock area. And it would be unrealistic to assume that none of the 100,000 patrons actually served by the Club each season was an interstate traveler. Since the Lake Nixon Club offered to serve and served out-of-state persons, and since the Club’s snack bar was established to serve all patrons of the entire facility, we must conclude that the snack bar offered to serve and served out-of-state persons.
The record also demonstrates that a “substantial portion of the food” served by the Lake Nixon Club snack bar has moved in interstate commerce. The snack bar serves a limited fare—hot dogs and hamburgers on buns, soft drinks, and milk. The District Court took judicial notice of the fact that the “principal ingredients going into the bread were produced and processed in other States” and that “certain ingredients [of the soft drinks] were probably obtained ... from out-of-State sources.” … Thus, at the very least, three of the four food items sold at the snack bar contain ingredients originating outside of the State. There can be no serious doubt that a “substantial portion of the food” served at the snack bar has moved in interstate commerce.
The snack bar’s status as a covered establishment automatically brings the entire Lake Nixon facility within the ambit of … [the] Civil Rights Act of 1964.
Petitioners also argue that the Lake Nixon Club is a covered public accommodation under [other provisions of the statute.] … These sections proscribe discrimination by “any motion picture house, theater, concert hall, sports arena, stadium or other place of exhibition or entertainment” which “customarily presents films, performances, athletic teams, exhibitions, or other sources of entertainment which move in commerce.“ Under any accepted definition of “entertainment,” the Lake Nixon Club would surely qualify as a “place of entertainment.” and indeed it advertises itself as such. Respondent argues, however, that… “place of entertainment” refers only to establishments where patrons are entertained as spectators or listeners rather than those where entertainment takes the form of direct participation in some sport or activity. We find no support in the legislative history for respondent’s reading of the statute. The few indications of legislative intent are to the contrary… .
The remaining question is whether the operations of the Lake Nixon Club “affect commerce.” … We conclude that they do. Lake Nixon’s customary “sources of entertainment move in commerce.” The Club leases 15 paddle boats on a royalty basis from an Oklahoma company. Another boat was purchased from the same company. The Club’s jukebox was manufactured outside Arkansas and plays records manufactured outside the State. The legislative history indicates that mechanical sources of entertainment such as these were considered by Congress to be “sources of entertainment” within the meaning of [the Act.]
Ruling of the Court: Reversed.
Summarize the two Separate grounds the court used to determine that Lake Nixon was a place of public accommodation and thus covered by the Act.