THE QUESTION WILL BE ON FILE PLEASE . I had to take multiple question to show everything

5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is Y , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote Y the legisla If the benefits of the legi inefcient ncentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to spend up to g the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the benefits.) The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the V is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. Suppose that, as before, the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a small group, the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote Y the legislation. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is V , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote Y the legislation. fits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to V lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them lations of the few who experience the benefits.) The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the V is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. Suppose that, as before, the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a small group, the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote Y the legislation. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is V , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote V the legislation. If the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to spend up to V lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calcul -w who experience the benefits.) $4 million The less wid $0 million the costs of the legislation, the V is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. $26 million Suppose tha $30 million e benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a small group, the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive t $ ll e likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote 56 mi ion n. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is Y , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote Y the legislation. If the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to spend up to Y lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the benefits.) The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the Y is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. Suppose that, as before, the benefits of the legislation are lower -ted among a small group, the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbyi - . u . the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote Y the legislation. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is V , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote V the legislation. If the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of wide the population, those people will be willing to $26 million spend up to V lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assu .ts are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the benefits.) $55 million $0 million The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the V is the likelihou against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. $4 million $30 million _ _ osts are very WIdespread, and the Assembly IS Suppose that, as before, the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a 5m. responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote V the legislation. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufar is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is V , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote v the legislation. If the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to spend up to V lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the benefits.) The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the V is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. - at, as before, the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a small groupr the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is against to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is V , in which case the Assembly will likely vote v the legislation. 5. Distribution of benefits and costs The Assembly, the legislature of the fictional country of Manufa, is considering legislation that will generate benefits of $30 million and costs of $26 million. For perspective, Manufa's population is 50 million. Passing the legislation is Y , and if everyone in Manufa shared equally in both its benefits and its costs, the Assembly will vote V the legislation. If the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a few people instead of widespread among the population, those people will be willing to spend up to V lobbying the Assembly for the legislation. (Note: Assume that the costs are widespread; therefore, you can ignore them in the calculations of the few who experience the benefits.) The less widely spread are the costs of the legislation, the Y is the likelihood of lobbying against the legislation by those who will incur its costs. Suppose that, as before, the benefits of the legislation are concentrated among a small group, the costs are very widespread, and the Assembly is responsive to lobbying. The likely amount spent on lobbying against the legislation is Y , in which case the Assembly will likely vote V the legislation