There are three necessary prerequisites for effective self$-$regulation in any market: $1)$ there must be an association, $2)$ it must be motivated to regulate its members' behavior, $3)$ it must maintain sufficient powers of control for this purpose. In respect to stock exchanges, the first condition is undoubtedly satisfied, exchanges being, by definition, associations of member$-$brokers. As to the third condition, stock exchanges, through their decision$-$making bodies, have wide powers to discipline members and to make rules protecting investors. Whether the second condition would be satisfied in the absence of existing government regulation is$,$ however, debatable.

In principle, stock exchanges have ample motivation to regulate their members. A failure to curb abuses by member$-$brokers would deter investors, reducing the volume of trading on an exchange, hence lowering all members' profits. However, brokers are a diverse group of rivals and, as such, will regulate themselves effectively only within a system of checks and balances that fairly harmonizes their conflicting interests. Given sufficient diversity in its makeup and sufficient emphasis on consensual decision$-$making, the governing body of a stock exchange could provide an adequate check on dishonest practice by powerful individual members of the exchange, or groups of members. There is$,$ however, no evidence to confirm that such a pluralistic model accurately describes stock exchange governance in the real world.

According to the passage, which of the following will occur if$,$ in the absence of government regulation, a stock exchange fails to curb abuses by its members?

Pressure will mount for government regulation of the market.

Certain groups of investors will become too influential.

The profits of most investors in the market will decrease.

Investors will be discouraged from investing in the market.

Conflicts among association members will increase.