1. There are two identical objects for sale by sequential ascending bid auction. There are two bidders, acting without collusion, who each have positive valuations for the two items. Bidder A has a value of 200 for one item and a marginal value for an additional item of 199. Bidder B has a value of 198 for one item and a marginal value for an additional item of 1. Each bidder knows their own valuations as well as the valuations of their opponent. Assume the auctioneer has a reserve price of zero at each auction. There is no post-auction resale possible.
   1. For the second auction, what are the bids of each bidder and the outcome of the auction?
   2. In light of your answer to a, what is the outcome of the first auction?
   3. How does your answer differ from what these bidders could accomplish acting collusively?
   4. If the auctioneer could select a positive reserve price that maximized revenue for the auctioneer, how would that change your answers to each of the questions above?