there is another quesiton

Consider the following 3-player static game with row player Batman (his choices are a and b), column player Catwomart (her choices are c and d), and matrix player joker (his choices are left, middle and right): left middle right I: d c d c d 1,1,5 1,0,1 1,1,3 1,0,0 1,1,0 1,0,0 0,0,0 0,1,0 0,0,0 0,1,3 0,0,0 0,1,5 (a) Give a belief for loker about his opponents' choice combinations that supports his choice of middle (i.e. such that middle is optimal for him). ( 7 marks) (b) Solve the game with iterated strict dominance. ( 8 marks) (c) Construct an epistemic model such that, for every choice found in (b) there exists a type such that: ' the choice is optimal for the type, 0 and the type expresses common belief in rationality. (10 marks)