Two rival technology companies developed two very special software packages that are perfect substitutes. The development cost of the software is unknown, but both companies sell their software packages over the Web as a download, so the marginal cost is zero. The software Wm small investors around the world. A study conducted by the Association of Individual Investors concluded that the market demand for that software is Q = 900 - P. Where Q is the total quantity sold (Q = Q1_ + Q2) i]: Suppose each rm maximizes its own prot using the Wmodel. Determine the level of output each rm will produce and the price each rm will charge for the software package. ii. Now suppose the two rms colluded to set the monopoly output and price and maximize total industry prots. How much higher [or lower) is the selling price and the total industry output when the two rms colluded compared with the price and output when the two rms competed based on the gaging]; model? iii. Finally. if the two rms follow a competitive strategy. What would be the price and the total quantity sold