UCIL was a pesticide manufacturing plant that produced the insecticide carbaryl. Carbaryl was

discovered by the American company Union Carbide Corporation, which owned a significant

share in UCIL. As an intermediary, UCIL produced carbaryl using methyl isocyanate (MIC).

Other techniques of producing the ultimate product are available, but they are more expensive.

The very toxic chemical MIC is extremely dangerous to human health. Residents of Bhopal in

the area of the pesticide plant began to feel irritated by the MIC and began fleeing the city.

Reasons for gas leak

1. During the buildup to the spill, the plant's safety mechanisms for the highly toxic MIC

were not working.

2. Many valves and lines were in disrepair, and many vent gas scrubbers were not working,

as was the steam boiler that was supposed to clean the pipes.

3. The MIC was stored in three tanks, with tank E610 being the source of the leak. This tank

should have held no more than 30 tonnes of MIC, according to safety regulations.

4. Water is believed to have entered the tank through a side pipe as technicians were

attempting to clear it late that fatal night.

5. This resulted in an exothermic reaction in the tank, progressively raising the pressure

until the gas was ejected through the atmosphere.

Effects of Gas Leak

1. Thousands had died as a result of choking, pulmonary edema, and reflexogenic

circulatory collapse.

2. Neonatal death rates increased by 200 percent.

3. A huge number of animal carcasses have been discovered in the area, indicating the

impact on flora and animals. The trees died after a few days. Food supplies have grown

scarce due to the fear of contamination.

4. Fishing was also prohibited.

5. In March 1985, the Indian government established the Bhopal Gas Leak Accident Act,

giving it legal authority to represent all victims of the accident, whether they were in

India or abroad.

6. At least 200,000 youngsters were exposed to the gas.

7. Hospitals were overcrowded, and there was no sufficient training for medical workers to

deal with MIC exposure.

Aftermath

In the United States, UCC was sued in federal court. In one action, the court recommended that

UCC pay between $5 million and $10 million to assist the victims. UCC agreed to pay a $5

million settlement. The Indian government, however, rejected this offer and claimed $3.3 billion.

In 1989, UCC agreed to pay $470 million in damages and paid the cash immediately in an outof-court settlement.

Warren Anderson, the CEO and Chairman of UCC, was charged with manslaughter by Bhopal

authorities in 1991. He refused to appear in court and the Bhopal court declared him a fugitive

from justice in February 1992. Despite the central government's efforts on the United States to

extradite Anderson, nothing happened. Anderson died in 2014 without ever appearing in a court

of law.

Background

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL)

In 1970, in the North adjacent to the slums and railway station, a pesticide plant was set up by

Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL). From late 1977, the plant started manufacturing Sevin

(Carbaryl) by importing primary raw materials, viz. alpha-naphtol and methyl isocyanate (MIC)

in stainless steel drums from the Union Carbide's MIC plant in USA. However, from early 1980,

the Bhopal plant itself started manufacturing MIC using the know-how and basic designs

supplied by Union Carbide Corporation, USA (UCC). The Bhopal UCIL facility housed three

underground 68,000 liters liquid MIC storage tanks: E610, E611, and E619 and were claimed to

ensure all safety from leakage.

Time Line of Occupational Hazards of the Union Carbide India Limited Plant Leading

Before the Disaster

1976: Local trade unions complained of pollution within the plant.

1980: A worker was reported to have accidentally been splashed with phosgene while carrying

out a regular maintenance job of the plant's pipes.

1982 (January): A phosgene leak exposed 24 workers, all of whom were admitted to a hospital.

Investigation revealed that none of the workers had been ordered to wear protective masks.

1982 (February): An MIC leak affected 18 workers.

1982 (August): A chemical engineer came into contact with liquid MIC, resulting in burns over

30 percent of his body.

1982 (October): In attempting to stop the leak, the MIC supervisor suffered severe chemical

burns and two other workers were severely exposed to the gases.

1983-1984: There were leaks of MIC, chlorine, monomethylamine, phosgene, and carbon

tetrachloride, sometimes in combination.

In early December 1984, most of the Bhopal plant's MIC related safety systems were not

functioning and many valves and lines were in poor condition. In addition, several vent gas

scrubbers had been out of service as well as the steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes. For the

major maintenance work, the MIC production and Sevin were stalled in Bhopal plant since Oct.

22, 1984 and major regular maintenance was ordered to be done during the weekdays' day shifts.

The Sevin plant, after having been shut down for some time, had been started up again during

November but was still running at far below normal capacity. To make the pesticide, carbon

tetrachloride is mixed with methyl isocyanate (MIC) and alpha-naphthol, a coffee-colored

powder that smells like mothballs. The methyl isocyanate, or MIC, was stored in the three partly

buried tanks, each with a 15,000-gallon capacity.

During the late evening hours of December 2, 1984, whilst trying to unclog, water was believed

to have entered a side pipe and into Tank E610 containing 42 tons of MIC that had been there

since late October. Introduction of water into the tank began a runaway exothermic reaction,

which was accelerated by contaminants, high ambient temperatures and other factors, such as the

presence of iron from corroding non-stainless steel pipelines.

A Three Hour Time Line of the Disaster

December 3, 1984 12:40 am: A worker, while investigating a leak, stood on a concrete slab

above three large, partly buried storage tanks holding the chemical MIC. The slab suddenly

began to vibrate beneath him and he witnessed at least a 6 inche thick crack on the slab and

heard a loud hissing sound. As he prepared to escape from the leaking gas, he saw gas shoot out

of a tall stack connected to the tank, forming a white cloud that drifted over the plant and toward

nearby neighborhoods where thousands of residents were sleeping. In short span of time, the leak

went out of control.

December 3, 1984 12:45 am: The workers were aware of the enormity of the accident. They

began to panic both because of the choking fumes, they said, and because of their realization that

things were out of control; the concrete over the tanks cracked as MIC turned from liquid to gas

and shot out the stack, forming a white cloud. Part of it hung over the factory, the rest began to

drift toward the sleeping neighborhoods nearby.

December 3, 1984 12:50 am: The public siren briefly sounded and was quickly turned off, as

per company procedure meant to avoid alarming the public around the factory over tiny leaks.

Workers, meanwhile, evacuated the UCIL plant. The control room operator then turned on the

vent gas scrubber, a device designed to neutralize escaping toxic gas. The scrubber had been

under maintenance; the flow meter indicated there was no caustic soda flowing into the device. It

was not clear to him whether there was actually no caustic soda in the system or whether the

meter was broken. Broken gauges were not unusual at the factory. In fact, the gas was not being

neutralized but was shooting out the vent scrubber stack and settling over the plant.

December 3, 1984 1: 15- 1:30 am: At Bhopal's 1,200-bed Hamidia Hospital, the first patient

with eye trouble reported. Within five minutes, there were a thousand patients. Calls to the UCIL

plant by police were twice assured that "everything is OK", and on the last attempt made, "we

don't know what has happened, sir". In the plant, meanwhile, MIC began to engulf the control

room and the adjoining offices.

December 3, 1984 3:00 am: The factory manager, arrived at the plant and sent a man to tell the

police about the accident because the phones were out of order. The police were not told earlier

because the company management had an informal policy of not involving the local authorities

in gas leaks. Meanwhile, people were dying by the hundreds outside the factory. Some died in

their sleep. Others ran into the cloud, breathing in more and more gas and dropping dead in their

tracks.

Immediate Consequences

With the lack of timely information exchange between Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) and

Bhopal authorities, the city's Hamidia Hospital was first told that the gas leak was suspected to

be ammonia, then phosgene. They were then told that it was methyl isocyanate (MIC), which

hospital staff had never heard of, had no antidote for, and received no immediate information

about. The gas cloud, composed mainly of materials denser than air, stayed close to the ground

and spread in the southeasterly direction affecting the nearby communities. Most city residents

who were exposed to the MIC gas were first made aware of the leak by exposure to the gas itself.

Subsequent Actions

Formal statements were issued that air, water, vegetation and foodstuffs were safe, but warned

not to consume fish. The number of children exposed to the gases was at least 200,000. Within

weeks, the State Government established a number of hospitals, clinics and mobile units in the

gas-affected area to treat the victims.

Legal proceedings involving UCC, the United States and Indian governments, local Bhopal

authorities, and the disaster victims started immediately after the catastrophe. The Indian

Government passed the Bhopal Gas Leak Act in March 1985, allowing the Government of India

to act as the legal representative for victims of the disaster, leading to the beginning of legal

proceedings.

Initial lawsuits were generated in the United States federal court system in April 1985.

Eventually, in an out-of-court settlement reached in February 1989, Union Carbide agreed to pay

US$470 million for damages caused in the Bhopal disaster. The amount was immediately paid.

Post-settlement activity

UCC chairman and CEO Warren Anderson was arrested and released on bail by the Madhya

Pradesh Police in Bhopal on 7 December 1984. Anderson was taken to UCC's house after which

he was released six hours later on $2,100 bail and flown out on a government plane. Anderson,

eight other executives and two company affiliates with homicide charges were required to appear

in Indian court.

In response, Union Carbide said the company is not under Indian jurisdiction. In 1991, the local

Bhopal authorities charged Anderson, who had retired in 1986, with manslaughter, a crime that

carries a maximum penalty of 10 years in prison. He was declared a fugitive from justice by the

Chief Judicial Magistrate of Bhopal on 1 February 1992 for failing to appear at the court

hearings in a culpable homicide case in which he was named the chief defendant. Orders were

passed to the Government of India to press for an extradition from the United States. From 2014,

Dow is a named respondent in a number of ongoing cases arising from Union Carbide's business

in Bhopal.

A US Federal class action litigation, Sahu v. Union Carbide and Warren Anderson, had been

filed in 1999 under the U.S. Alien Torts Claims Act (ATCA), which provides for civil remedies

for "crimes against humanity." It sought damages for personal injury, medical monitoring and

injunctive relief in the form of clean-up of the drinking water supplies for residential areas near

the Bhopal plant. The lawsuit was dismissed in 2012 and subsequent appeal denied. Anderson

died in 2014.

Long-term Health Effects

A total of 36 wards were marked by the authorities as being "gas affected," affecting a

population of 520,000. Of these, 200,000 were below 15 years of age, and 3,000 were pregnant

women. The official immediate death toll was 2,259, and in 1991, 3,928 deaths had been

officially certified. The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related

to the gas release. Later, the affected area was expanded to include 700,000 citizens. A

government affidavit in 2006 stated the leak caused 558,125 injuries including 38,478 temporary

partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely and permanently disabling injuries.

Ethical Negligence

The Corporate Negligence Argument: This point of view argues that management (and to

some extent, local government) underinvested in safety, which allowed for a dangerous working

environment to develop.

Safety audits: In September 1984, an internal UCC report on the West Virginia plant in the

USA revealed a number of defects and malfunctions. It warned that "a runaway reaction could

occur in the MIC unit storage tanks, and that the planned response would not be timely or

effective enough to prevent catastrophic failure of the tanks". This report was never forwarded to

the Bhopal plant, although the main design was the same.

The Disgruntled Employee Sabotage Argument: Now owned by Dow Chemical Company,

Union Carbide maintains a website dedicated to the tragedy and claims that the incident was the

result of sabotage, stating that sufficient safety systems were in place and operative to prevent

the intrusion of water.

 

As you read and analyze this case study, your reflective comments are requested on all of the

following:

 Who are the stakeholders and how are they impacted both positively and negatively?

 

What knowledge and skills are needed to implement sophisticated, appropriate, and

 

workable solutions to the complex global problems facing the world today?

 

What interdisciplinary perspectives would help identify innovative and non-obvious solutions?

What insights can you articulate, based on your culture and other cultures with which you are familiar, to help understand your worldview and enable greater civic engagement?

 What is your position on the right thing(s) to do?