Use the table to answer the question. The table shows the demand schedule for tickets to watch amateur soccer games in a medium$-$sized town. The city provides the soccer fields, and the players play for free, so the marginal cost of providing the games is zero. The city has authorized two companies to provide soccer games in two stadiums, and the public considers the games in each stadium to be equivalent.

$\backslash$table$[[$Price$,$Quantity$],[12,0],[11,200],[10,400],[9,600],[8,800],[7,1,000],[6,1,200],[5,1,400],[3,1,600],[2,1,800],[1,2,000],[0,2,200],[2,2,400]]$

If the two companies in this soccer market collude and successfully form a cartel, what is the price that each should charge in order to maximize profits?

a$.$ $$8$

b$.$ $$7$

c$.$ $$6$

d$.$ $$5$

e$.$ $$4$