Using a payoff matrix to determine the equilibrium outcome

Suppose that Slow Flow and Stew Star are the only two firms in a hypothetical market that produce and sell slow cookers. The following payoff matrix gives profit scenarios for each company $($in millions of dollars$),$ depending on whether it chooses to set a high or low price for slow cookers.

$\backslash$table$[[,,$Stew Star Pricing$],[,,$High,Low$],[$Slow Flow Pricing,High,$12,12,6,17],[$Low$,17,6,10,10]]$

For example, the lower$-$left cell shows that if Slow Flow prices low and Stew Star prices high, Slow Flow will earn a profit of $$17$ million, and Stew Star will earn a profit of $$6$ million. Assume this is a simultaneous game and that Slow Flow and Stew Star are both profit$-$maximizing firms.

If Slow Flow prices high, Stew Star will make more profit if it chooses a $q,$ price, and if Slow Flow prices low, Stew Star will make more profit if it chooses a $q,$ price.

If Stew Star prices high, Slow Flow will make more profit if it chooses a $q,$ price, and if Stew Star prices low, Slow Flow will make more profit if it chooses a $$ price.

Considering all of the information given, pricing low $q,$ a dominant strategy for both Slow Flow and Stew Star.

If the firms do not collude, what strategies will they end up choosing?

Both Slow Flow and Stew Star will choose a high price.

Both Slow Flow and Stew Star will choose a low price.

Slow Flow will choose a low price, and Stew Star will choose a high price.

Slow Flow will choose a high price, and Stew Star will choose a low price.

True or False: The game between Slow Flow and Stew Star is not an example of the prisoners' dilemma.

True