1. (Using Excel) (Cannibalization) Suppose in the Stanford Stadium problem that 10% of the General Public would use false pretenses (counterfeit or borrowed student ID) to buy a student ticket. Stanford knows this. Assume the same initial response functions we used in class, and assume the willingness to pay distribution for cheaters is the same as non-cheaters (i.e., uniform). (Hint: Build three response functions: (a) students, (b) cheaters, (c) non-cheaters.)
   1. Write out the correct optimization formulation for this problem. Use ps for the student price, pg for the general public price.
   2. How should Stanford set their General Public and Student prices? (solve for optimal prices in Excel)
   3. What are the new optimal revenues?
   4. How many of the student ticket sales are to real students and how many are to fake students?

General Public: d_g (p _g) = (120000 - 3000 p _g )

Student: d_s (p_s) = (20000 -1250p_s)