Volker, Caryn and Maurice need to find a new macro economist. They have four candidates (Adam, Beth, Chris and Detlev) or A, B, C and D in short. Their preference ranking is as follows

	Volker	Caryn	Maurice	Sarah	Jill
#1	B	D	C	A	D
#2	A	B	B	D	C
#3	C	C	A	C	B
#4	D	A	D	B	A

Assume that they decide to determine the winner via agenda voting and Volker is put in charge of setting the agenda

a) In which order would Volker set the pairings to have his favorite (C) win? For now assume that everybody is expected to vote sincerely.

b) Two of the 4 others can vote strategically to improve the outcome for him/her. Who are they and how can they accomplish it? Explain clearly why the others cannot achieve anything with strategic voting. Remember that the order of matches is set in part a) – you cannot change the order, just the vote of one of the professors.

c) Can Volker anticipate and counter any of the strategic moves from part b)? If yes, how?

d) Does anyone else have a reason to switch votes given your result in c)? Explain!

Answer rating: 100% (QA)

a Vol ker should set the pair ings as follows A vs B C vs D B vs D and A vs C b C aryn and Maurice c... View the full answer