What is the critical leadership problem facing the 2nd ABCT and how will you use the processes and concepts from L100 to improve the ABCT and achieve your vision? Clearly and comprehensively explain, defend, and justify your answer.

Administrative Instructions: This is your end-of-block exam for L100. The purpose of this assessment is to demonstrate your achievement of the TLO for L100, which is: "Analyze organizational level leadership concepts used to lead in developing organizations." This exam is based on the 2nd Armor Brigade Combat Team case study and the L100 learning objectives. Your answer will be no more than five (5) pages in length .

You will answer the question from the perspective of the new brigade commander, LTC (P) Nguyen. Ensure you incorporate the criteria of the rubric into your response. In this individual essay assignment, you must demonstrate your ability to analyze the organizational-level leadership processes from L100 and apply them to a problem.

Assigned Reading:

L100 Take Home Exam Case Study, AY 2022-2023

"The 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team"

You are LTC (P) Morgan Nguyen. A month ago, you arrived on post to assume command of the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team (ABCT) after attending the Army War College. The current brigade commander, COL Jim Anderson, is retiring early for medical reasons. Your change of command is in thirty days. COL Anderson was very gracious in facilitating your access to many aspects of the brigade to help prepare you for assuming command. In the last thirty days, you had an opportunity to observe the ABCT and review a multitude of historical documents to assess the state of the brigade. The 2nd ABCT recently returned from a nine-month rotation to the Republic of Korea and is in the prepare phase of the Regionally Aligned Readiness and Modernization Model (ReARMM). The brigade was back at home station for almost two months and reintegration training and block leave are complete. The most significant event in the next 12 months is the brigade's rotation at the National Training Center (NTC). This rotation is in preparation for a pending mission to Poland to support Atlantic Resolve. The mission is in support of U.S. Army Europe and requires two battalion-sized task forces to deploy for nine months. Simultaneously, the RAF mission requires the remainder of the 2nd ABCT to support several theater security cooperation engagements on the European continent, ranging in size from two-person teams to a company plus. While U.S. Army Europe may cancel some of the existing engagements, they expect the number of engagements to increase, many with limited preparation time. During the recent deployment the 2nd ABCT was attached to the 2ID (Combined) Division Headquarters permanently stationed in Korea. The 2nd ABCT worked with several other BDE HQs that were permanently stationed in Korea as part of EIGHTH ARMY, yet the 2nd ABCT treated the Korean deployment like a "combat deployment" by enforcing a curfew, denying passes and weekends off, running 24-7 operations, and directing and enforcing the alcohol prohibition per "General Order 1A". This perceived misalignment with what permanent party units could do versus the 2nd BCT in a Temporary Change of Station (TCS) status added to the collective aggravation of the unit. Further, due to operational needs and capability shortfalls in another brigade, the 2nd BCT detached one of its combined arms battalions for a nine-month deployment to Jordan. This battalion, "The War Hawks," gained a reputation for being star performers and are very proud of the other division patch they wear on their right shoulder. The War Hawks off-handedly refer to their Jordanian deployment as the "real" deployment compared to the Korean experience that the rest of the brigade had. The two other divisional BCTs on post deployed to Europe and are due to return in six months. Many of the current 2nd ABCT staff PCS in the next few months and the changes of command for three of the four battalions occur in the next sixty days. Your initial meetings with COL Anderson, and CSM Dana Kuptain, the brigade command sergeant major, gave you a very positive perception of the ABCT. From your conversations with several individuals over the last thirty days, you learned that years ago 2nd ABCT had a great reputation. By all measurements, the brigade excelled. Morale across the brigade was high and it seemed the brigade attracted the best of the officer and non-commissioned officer corps. The brigade had focus. Leaders and L100 Exam Case Study 2 May 2022 (AY 22-23) Soldiers were dedicated to the mission and a supportive family atmosphere existed among the battalions. There was a strong work ethic. Problems existed, of course, but there was a prevailing attitude that most problems could be resolved. Regularly, leaders solved problems at lower levels, and they rarely reached the brigade command level. There was competition within the brigade, but it was positively oriented toward the success of the brigade. Frequent coordination occurred among peers to share information, resources, and lessons learned. Frequently the brigade and battalion officers met informally for social events and although these were social occasions, the leaders could not help but discuss ways to improve their brigade. Leaders shared information freely with little regard for ownership or competitiveness. Often the battalion and brigade commanders were active participants. A similar environment existed among the battalion and brigade non-commissioned officers. Now it appears the environment is different. The battalions are competing, not to improve the brigade, but to set themselves apart from their sister units. Camaraderie amongst the battalion commanders and command sergeants major appears superficial. Over the last month, you had the opportunity to review several historical documents, observe routine meetings, speak with members of the brigade, and walk around the brigade area. Your review of the brigade's historical unit status report (USR) indicates the 2nd ABCT completed all necessary training and received its required equipment prior to departing for Korea. The ABCT deployed at ninety-two percent strength, although the assigned strength was 105 percent. The commander's comments specifically highlighted that brigade leaders and Soldiers were well trained and qualified. Most of the non-deployable Soldiers remained at home station for medical reasons that surfaced within sixty to ninety days prior to the deployment date. During the deployment, the brigade redeployed more than 100 Soldiers for non-training-related medical problems. While the installation's medical providers addressed many of the non-deployable Soldiers' medical concerns, a significant number of non-deployable Soldiers remain on unit roles. Additionally, since returning, the number of medical non-deployable Soldiers has slightly increased above pre-deployment numbers. The high number of "issues" and early redeployments had created an increased interest across the 2ID HQ and staff and the home station division headquarters in questioning the accuracy of the ABCT's pre-deployment USR report. Approximately three months into the brigade's nine-month deployment, an incident occurred that started a series of events that has dragged the brigade into a tailspin. The previous brigade Command Sergeant Major, CSM Mullins, was involved in a vehicle accident with a Korean family. The accident did not result in any deaths but did severely injure several Korean nationals. CSM Mullins was found to be at fault by the Korean National Police (KNP) due to DUI, but the ensuing investigation uncovered more than just the DUI. The authorities discovered that the brigade CSM had a female service member in the POV with him who was also injured in the accident. The female service member was a sergeant in the brigade S1 shop and whose husband was a sergeant in one of the battalions in the field at Rodriguez Range. The Korean authorities released the findings to US authorities. COL Johnson, the previous BCT CDR, tried to downplay the events, preventing them from being publicized, and orchestrated a cover up to keep his CSM out of trouble and the whole incident quiet. Eventually the cover up emerged exposing COL Johnson and CSM Mullins' misconduct and the division commander relieved them. Upon COL Johnson's relief the DCO, LTC (P) Alex Frazer, assumed command of the brigade until the arrival of COL Anderson. CSM Kuptain arrived from CONUS a week later to take the vacant position from CSM Mullins. Another document you reviewed is a Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) report compiled from observations of the 2nd ABCT in Korea. From all accounts, the ABCT and its leaders performed as well as possible in Korea, given the circumstances. However, the official L100 Exam Case Study 3 May 2022 (AY 22-23) record indicates significant challenges requiring attention. The extensive study identified several specific issues that may have an impact on the organization's future effectiveness. You highlighted the following sections of the report. Multiple and often incompatible communications systems hampered command and control throughout the brigade. At battalion and below levels, the varying battlefield, electronic, and environmental conditions required leaders to carry multiple radios to communicate effectively. Further, the dispersed nature of the Brigade being stationed at multiple camps created significant digital network challenges for the brigade's network technicians. The digital network frequently crashed, making communication loss between the brigade and subordinate battalion headquarters a normal, if not daily, occurrence. While tactical satellite and high frequency radios provided some redundancy, the limited number of systems and frequencies available to the brigade created operational and personal friction. Personnel authorizations on the battalion staffs were not sufficient to sustain 24-hour operations over the nine-month deployment. Often battle captains were taken "out of hide" to conduct the mission, resulting in unqualified and untrained personnel attempting to perform battalion tactical operations center functions, especially during the evening hours. This contributed to increased friction between the brigade and battalion staffs. While BN staffs were undermanned, the BDE Staff was adequately manned. The modular BCT structure created training challenges, especially within the combined arms battalions. The Battalion Commanders took advantage of the "deployed environment" to conduct multiple alert procedures, deployments to local training areas, and several live fire exercises. The persistent strain on the Battalion staffs to plan, resource, coordinate across their instillations and with the Brigade staff weighed heavily on them. The high operational tempo (OPTEMPO) and a lack of critical modified table of organization and equipment (MTOE) authorizations especially affected the BEB ability to support both brigade and battalion operations. The dispersed nature of the battalions required the BSB and their Forward Support Companies (FSCs) to spend increased time on the roads supporting outlying locations. The CALL report also indicated a potential problem existed within the culture of the organization. The desire to be an elite, highly professional unit led to the development of behaviors that were generally good-natured and helped instill an esprit de corps within the unit. However, the CALL reports also contain information that implies some non-commissioned and junior officers allowed these esprit de corps building events to devolve to an extreme degree during the deployment. The report suggests that the events have progressed from esprit building to "sanctioned hazing" according to one junior non-commissioned officer. You viewed the results of a climate survey that revealed that commanders shared a lack of willingness to include subordinates in decision-making. Those commanders did not meet the expectations of their junior officers on developing subordinates, coaching, and counseling. There is a perception by many officers of a lack of concern for leader development by the brigade leadership. The report indicated battalion commanders do not routinely counsel company commanders on their performance and the captains receive little to no developmental guidance from either their rater or senior rater. One company commander commented, "I have always been a top performer, I just do my best and hope it is good enough. If no one is yelling at me, I'm golden." In additional to leader development challenges, the brigade is also working to overcome L100 Exam Case Study 4 May 2022 (AY 22-23) multiple equipment readiness challenges. Many of these are due to recurring shortages of Class IX due to a mix up of funding codes for the deployment versus home station. The climate survey also revealed some Soldiers within the HQ seem to like being a member of the ABCT, but report stress because of the unknown requirements of the upcoming RAF mission and the affect they anticipate it will have on their families. There is clearly some disappointment amongst the leaders in the ABCT. One entry read, "COL Anderson tells us in formations to take care of our families, but he never gives us time to do the things we need to do for them. My husband is really fed up with this unit." Another comment reads, "Major Cass (Brigade S4) is always talking to the female Soldiers. I can tell he makes them uncomfortable by the amount of attention he pays them. He even goes out of his way to get certain females into his office. I think it is affecting the performance of the section, but what can I do, I am only a specialist." Another comment read, "I am tired of getting chewed out about the smallest of issues. The leadership around here is on edge all the time. We never get anything done. We reinvent the wheel monthly to no purpose. Can't wait to leave." There were also several specific comments about a lack of time to complete assigned tasks and a frustration that despite working long hours nothing seemed to change. You can find no indication that the ABCT leadership took any action on the issues within the survey. The last historical document you reviewed was the brigade's reset plan and timeline. A careful study of the document reveals the brigade returned fifty-five days ago. The brigade has another thirty-five days in the prepare phase before transitioning to the ready phase. Of immediate concern is the pending arrival of the unit's containers and redeploying equipment from Korea. The ship arrived at the port ten days ago and immediately began downloading equipment to rail back to home station. COL Anderson expects the equipment to start arriving this week and be complete over the next two weeks. Of critical importance is the turn-in of ancillary equipment (NBC, NVGs, and radios) to the special repair teams beginning in ten days. The special repair teams will keep the brigade's equipment for the next four to six weeks to complete technical inspections and repair. Earlier in the week, you had an opportunity to discuss the synchronization conference with COL Anderson. The conference included representatives from Forces Command (FORSCOM), Department of the Army G1, G3/5/7, G4, G8, Army Material Command (AMC), and the division staff primaries. You learned that the program executive office (PEO) Ground Combat Systems Representative reported that you will not receive your new issue for at least another fourteen days. Further, Program Executive Office Command, Control, Communications-Tactical (PEO C3T) Representative, mentioned the brigade will receive all new TOC equipment, but he did not think the equipment would be ready to issue for thirty days. The C3T representative also provided less than optimistic information regarding the brigade's satellite communication packages. Since the brigade chose to forego much-needed system upgrades prior to deployment, most components on the existing satellite terminals are out-of-date and no longer under warranty. Additionally, the Army is fielding new communication trailer systems over the next three quarters of the fiscal year, with the brigade's equipment not scheduled for delivery until just before entering the transition phase in 125 days. The information provided at the conference was grim. The division chief of staff, who attended the final out brief, pledged to COL Anderson that he would remain on top of the division G4 and G8 to ensure program managers and AMC upheld their end of the agreement and returned equipment to the brigade as soon as possible. The personnel outlook is mixed. The brigade is losing people as they move to new assignments or leave the Army. Most significantly, the change of command ceremonies for three of the brigade's battalions will occur in the next sixty days. You also know you will not receive a L100 Exam Case Study 5 May 2022 (AY 22-23) replacement for LTC (P) Frazer, as the brigade lost its DCO position under with the MTOE change. The last personal report indicated that the brigade had sixty to sixty-five percent of the staff sergeants required. This shortage was based on routine PCSs and transfers of NCOs to organizations deploying prior to 2nd ABCT with higher manning priorities. On a positive note, about half of the field grade officers in the battalions will remain in the brigade because they deployed late after completing the Command and General Staff Officer Course or their division staff time. The battalion XOs all appear competent and have a good understanding of their battalions' strengths and weaknesses and brigade-level systems. There is a significant turnover expected in the officers in the brigade headquarters and among company commanders. The brigade did receive some replacement personnel during the deployment and expects Human Resource Command to fill the brigade at eighty percent available strength overall and 75 percent senior grade before assumption of the RAF mission. MAJ Pat Donelson is the brigade S1. He is a recognized self-starter and well respected in the brigade. Yesterday he was discussing an inbound personnel printout with you, and he brought one specific officer to your attention. One of the inbound lieutenants is an engineer officer and recent graduate of Ranger School and Sapper School and he wanted to know where to put her. He then commented, "We don't want to screw this one up and hear about it on Twitter." After mentioning to you he was having trouble finding the equal opportunity (EO) NCO to address a question from the division EO office, MAJ Donelson also gave you a heads up about a rash of REFRAD requests. He said he just dropped off seven packets in COL Anderson's inbox of officers requesting release from active duty. He also mentioned, based on discussions with the battalion adjutants at the last adjutant's call, there would be more requests coming from the battalions. The brigade S2 is MAJ Pete Sanford. MAJ Sanford appears to be very confident and competent, but he seems extremely anxious about his recommendations since returning from Korea. He has some good systems in place, as well as a good team. He works very hard to be on top of everything. LTC (P) Frazer commented to you during one of your previous conversations "Sanford is overcompensating. He feels responsible for the investigation and denied redeployment of CPT Kim, the Alpha Company (MICO) Commander in the BEB. CPT Kim was implicated in allegations of misconduct and risk of OPSEC violations with local nationals and/or foreign agents while in Korea." MAJ Jeff Cass is the Brigade S4. The S4 section performed adequately while in Korea but is struggling with garrison operations. Jeff appears to be a good officer who knows the technical aspects of supply and maintenance management, but he clearly does not know how to run his staff. Many of the brigade leaders view his section as lacking commitment to the ideas and direction of the brigade commander. The S4 section has a conflict with the division G4 that has led to an adversarial relationship. The Soldiers in the section seem unmotivated and have a general lack of discipline across the group. MAJ Cass is under suspicion for improper use of the brigade's government purchase card (GPC) during the deployment and EIGHTH ARMY Chief of Staff has asked, through FORSCOM, to pursue an investigation. Division appointed an investigating officer (IO) just last week. MAJ Shawn Springsteen, the brigade's S6, appeared to be the least likely officer to complain about workload. However, last week after a particularly stressful staff meeting you heard her discussing something with the deputy. She commented, "Sir, I know you are busy, but I have to talk to someone. I am not sure how much more of this I can take. Nothing we do on this staff seems to be good enough and staffing actions never seem to get the time they deserve. We're not allowed to make routine decisions at our level, and it seems we jump from one crisis to another L100 Exam Case Study 6 May 2022 (AY 22-23) with no apparent direction. I thought when we returned from Korea the pace would improve a bit, at least for a short while, and allow me to get reacquainted with my family. It was far from that! I even had my leave shortened to support the division command post exercise. A division CPX for crying out loud! We just returned from deployment! We were told the division's new staff needed to resolve some internal staffing procedures, so they scheduled an out-of-cycle training exercise. Given this division's 24/7 mentality and helter-skelter attitude, I would almost rather be back in Korea. At least there everyone knows they're working 24/7 and no one really expects to know what will happen next. Plus, you don't have the family wondering why mommy isn't home. Even my husband, who basically ran the brigade's family readiness group when we were deployed, is about to throw in the towel." The 2nd ABCT Chaplain is CH (MAJ) Sam Cobb. You remember him from a previous assignment where he served as a battalion chaplain in another division a few years ago. He came in this morning and mentioned he was on the brigade commander's calendar and was bumped, again because "something important came up." This is the fifth time. "I had real trouble getting in to see the commander since we returned." His frustration and concerns were apparent as he went on to say, "You think we have problems, you don't know the half of it, the things I am hearing and seeing should be his priority." He continued voicing his concerns. "Without getting into too much detail I am actively counseling eight separate couples regarding infidelity or other marriage related issues. Many of these seem to involve issues from the last deployment. I never thought I would be this busy once we got home. It never seems to end." Last week you witnessed an exchange at a brigade command and staff meeting. The commander and sergeant major of one of the battalions provided COL Anderson and CSM Kuptain a detailed review on the impact "red cycle" taskings had on unit operations, to include individual training, personnel management, and equipment reset. The battalion commander stated, "We're caught between a rock and a hard place because we tell Soldiers to reconnect with their families after being away for nine months, then pile on so many competing requirements, they have to work until 19:00 hours each night. When you add on red-cycle tasks, the problem increases because you have fewer Soldiers to do the same amount of work. When my choice is to defer equipment turn-in for two weeks or keep Soldiers late telling them it's more important to guard motor pools and ranges than recover our equipment from war, we all lose credibility. Soldiers know the difference between activity to keep them alive and taskings." The battalion command sergeant major added, "This is worse than I've ever seen it. It seems we cannot catch a break on the ever-increasing extra duties and work details. When I mentioned this to the division command sergeant major at his last senior non-commissioned officer call, he dismissed me by saying, 'we had red cycles throughout my twenty-six years in the Army. They'll always be here, so quit complaining! You guys have been nothing but whiners since you returned from Korea!" COL Anderson responded, "Look I am not here to do your job for you! Figure it out! Nothing is coming off the plate. Do not expect me or the sergeant major to fix your problems or whine to division about what you can or can't do! Just get it done!" Your interactions with the officers in the Brigade S3 section were positive. All appeared professional, cooperative, and motivated by MAJ Roberta Vega. However, recent comments to you by two battalion S3s indicated a dictatorial side to the S3. Vega supposedly focuses on the hot issues of the day, not long-range planning. They also mentioned Vega's unwillingness to consider new ways of approaching the diverse training needs brought by the reconfiguration. Moreover, Vega indicated if they took their concerns to their battalion commanders (one of L100 Exam Case Study 7 May 2022 (AY 22-23) whom was new) they would regret it. When you mentioned this to LTC (P) Frazer, the DCO responded, "That's just Vega flexing her muscle. Her system works and there's no better brigade S3 in the division and everyone knows it. Those battalion officers need to quit sniveling and get to work." In a private conversation last week, CSM Kuptain mentioned to you, "I'm worried about my senior non-commissioned officers. They appear competent but I don't see any results from their work. They are sick and tired of the constant barrage of taskers, and they don't believe anything they do is making a difference. There is no priority. Yesterday it was that, today it is this. Tomorrow it will be something else. There appears to be little teamwork among them and their officers. When I ask them why they don't speak up and get involved, they ask, 'Why should I? Nothing ever comes of it. Our officers are only concerned about themselves, not the unit.'" As you moved throughout the brigade, you perceived an undercurrent of discussion that centers on potential incidents of sexual harassment within the brigade. The conversation centers around one of the "superstar" company commanders, CPT Seth Cooper. As one of the Distribution Platoon Leaders in the BSB, he travelled extensively around Korea. The consensus from the officers, NCOs, and enlisted personnel with whom you spoke is CPT Cooper gets results and is popular with battalion and brigade leaders. However, at least four individuals stated, "CPT Cooper really got around while he was on the road." Another stated, "CPT Cooper had a girlfriend at every camp." When you mention what you heard to LTC (P) Frazer, the DCO dismisses the issue by stating "CPT Cooper is very friendly, a real extrovert. Besides, the only person that mentioned anything approaching a complaint was a sub-par Soldier, so COL Anderson dismissed the allegation." You also found out the ABCT is experiencing a growing trend in three negative areas, domestic abuse, DUI, and divorces. The increases are across all battalions as well as the HQ. While the ABCT commander put policies in place to ensure immediate reporting of both abuse and DUI cases, there is no plan for prevention. The organization seems to be in react mode in these areas. Your discussions with the chaplain confirm the increase in divorces. He mentions to you that the reason appears to be marital unfaithfulness during the Korean deployment and an OPTEMPO that is causing the spouse at home to feel alone and without hope. The chaplain believes most of the issues with infidelity are internal to the brigade, with some cases among members of the brigade staff still ongoing, and allegations of infidelity by the Rear Detachment Commander, hence the mid-deployment removal and the "basically running the FRG" by the Brigade S6's husband. COL Anderson's response to the chaplain's concern about these allegations was simply, "Those are only rumors. Don't bring me that stuff without proof!" Finally, your informal conversations with friends in the division suggest the 2nd gained a reputation in Korea for being very "heavy-handed" in dealing with locals and accusations on the verge of abusing the Korean Augmentees to the United States Army (KATUSA). While the characterization started during the initial relief-in-place and transition of authority, their behavior took a marked downturn after the relief of the brigade command team. According to several sources outside the brigade, this approach appeared to inhibit the brigade's ability to conduct host-nation responsibilities. One of your more trusted sources stated emphatically, "Frazer's negative attitude of the Koreans created a cancer among some within the brigade, and it's still there. COL Anderson only made things worse with his hyperbole and condescending remarks about the partnered Republic of Korea (ROK) leadership to the "deployment status" in the ABCT area of operations. You need to be very careful." L100 Exam Case Study 8 May 2022 (AY 22-23) The past few weeks have been a blur for you. You understand the brigade has undergone numerous changes and know significant challenges lie ahead. Fortunately, the information you received from historical records, CALL and CAL assessments, and conversations and observations provided some much-needed information. You know there is not much time before the NTC rotation or when the brigade assumes the RAF mission and there are still many unknowns associated with this new requirement. As you begin to reflect on your upcoming assumption of command you know you need to identify and prioritize the challenges you see within the brigade, identify the processes you might use to improve the brigade, and determine how you will measure success.