When a firm moves from$$ straight$-$time pay to commission or$$ piece$-$rate pay, the productivity of a$$ firm's employees may$$

Part $2$

A$.$

decrease as less productive employees leave and those who remain have no incentive to sell more.$$

B$.$

increase as less productive employees leave and those who remain have an incentive to sell more.

C$.$

be affected as the employees who assume lower risk for higher pay.

D$.$

fall as they assume more risk but and have no incentive to sell more.

Part $3$

If$$ piece$-$rate or commission systems of compensating workers have important advantages for$$ firms, why$$ don't more firms use$$ them?

Some firms$$ don't use$$ piece$-$rate or commission systems of compensation because

A$.$

such forms of compensation provide less incentive for workers to produce more output.

B$.$

such forms of compensation impose

lessless

risk on

workersworkers.

C$.$

some firms are more concerned about quantity of output than quality.

D$.$

it is difficult to

measure outputmeasure$$output$.$

E$.$

such forms of compensation tend to

result in the most productive workers leavingresult$$in$$the$$most$$productive$$workers$$leaving