with mathematical theory

Problem 2.3 (15 points) Let E:{0,1}k{0,1}l{0,1}l be a block cipher. Consider the following symmetric encryption scheme SE=({0,1}k,E,D) whose message space is the set of messages whose length is a multiple of l bits and whose encryption and decryption algorithms are defined for each K{0,1}k as follows: \begin{tabular}{l|c} Algorithm EK(M): & Algorithm DK(C): \\ Break M into l-bit blocks: M1Mn & Break C into l-bit blocks: \\ IV${0,1,,2l1} & IVC1Cn \\ For i=1,,n do & For i=1,,n do \\ CiEK(IV+iMi) & MiEK1(Ci)IV+i \\ EndFor & EndFor \\ Return IVC1Cn & Return M1Mn \end{tabular} Above, "+" denotes addition modulo 2l and j " denotes the binary representation of integer j as an l-bit string. Show that SE is not IND-CPA secure, regardless of how secure E is. Hint: The advantage of your adversary doesn't have to be 1