Would you please see if you can provide step-by-step solutions for the problem that I attached?I want to gain a greater understanding of the process so that I can teach myself how to solve similar problems? Thanks

#1 PS7 (MICRO) 1. Consider the following Cournot oligopoly game with uncertain demand. There are two firms that both have constant marginal costs equal to 10. The inverse demand function takes the form P (Q) = A - Q, where Q is aggregate output by both firms, and A is a parameter that can be either 34 ("high demand") or 22 ("low demand"), with probability 1/2 each. (a) Suppose that both firms have to choose their output before the demand state is realized. Find the Nash equilibrium. (b) Suppose that both firms learn the demand state before choosing their output. Find the Nash equilibrium. (c) Suppose now that one firm learns the demand state before deciding how much output to produce, while the other one has no information about it. Find the Bayesian Nash equilibrium. (d) What is the "value of information" (in the sense we defined in the first chapter of the course on uncertainty) in this setting? How does it compare to the value of information for a monopolist in the same market environment? (e) Instead of the parameters described above, I could have chosen A = 24 in the high demand state and A = 12 in the low demand state, while setting costs to zero. Would this scenario be equivalent to the one above? Why or why not