Question: There are two groups of equal size, each with a utility function given by U(M) = M, where M = 100 is the initial wealth
a. What is the most a member of each group would be willing to pay to insure against this loss? b. In part (a), if it is impossible for outsiders to discover which individuals belong to which group, will it be practical for members of group 2 to insure against this loss in a competitive insurance market? (For simplicity, you may assume that insurance companies charge only enough in premiums to cover their expected benefit payments.) Explain.
c. Now suppose that the insurance companies in part (b) have an imperfect test for identifying which individuals belong to which group. If the test says that a person belongs to a particular group, the probability that he really does belong to that group is x < 1.0. How large must x be in order to alter your answer to part (b)?
Step by Step Solution
3.38 Rating (170 Votes )
There are 3 Steps involved in it
a For group 1 the reservation price of insurance is found by solving 100 x 1 5 100 5 64 9 Which yiel... View full answer
Get step-by-step solutions from verified subject matter experts
Document Format (1 attachment)
363-B-E-M-E (3559).docx
120 KBs Word File
