Carlos Brito transformed a Brazilian beer maker, Brahma, into one of the largest brewers in the world.
This 50-year-old Brazilian with an MBA from Stanford merged Brahma with the maker of Stella Artois into InBev NV, a Brazilian-Belgium hybrid brewer. It was InBev that made a $52 billion bid for Anheuser Busch of St. Louis, an iconic American brand. The company is Anheuser Busch-InBev, or AB-InBev NV, based in Belgium. Normally, individuals involved in such high-profi le deals have a swashbuckling attitude. This does not describe Mr. Brito, or as he prefers to be addressed, “Brito.”
He instilled a no-frills culture at InBev in which executives gave up individual secretaries and company cars. It was this frugal environment that allowed InBev to purchase Anheuser-Busch. Why did he instill this culture at AB-InBev and how did he get other executives to buy into this concept? His answer is simple:
Think like your customer. Or in Mr. Brito’s own words: “If you are doing anything that you think a consumer would not be willing to pay a premium for—think twice before doing it.” He uses his own frugality as an example: “I come to work by train. I tell the guys, ‘Being efficient is what our consumers would do.’ When I travel with my family, I don’t go for five-course meals, five-star hotels.”
“I also have to be humble and admit that we have learned a lot (through acquisitions),” he continues.
“Our marketing and ‘people’ tool kit evolved a lot. Now we want to start growing the right brands.”
Mr. Brito’s challenge is to revive Budweiser—that American icon. It labeled itself the “king of beer” and after many years began to believe it. But even kings must pass away, so Budweiser is now the number two selling beer in the United States after Bud Light. This is the equivalent of Diet Coke outselling Classic Coke. They are produced by the same brewer, but Budweiser is the original beer and its market share has been slipping for 21 years.
When InBev took over Anheuser-Busch, it carried forward the directive of Mr. Brito, recognizing individual differences. InBev eliminated 1,500 jobs, redesigned the company’s pay system, and reduced expenses. Business travelers on the road slept two to a room. Salesmen worked from a central office and used telephones rather than travel. All of these activities saved $1.67 billion and . . . Budweiser raised its prices. Only a beer with a premium image can do what Budweiser accomplished under Mr. Brito. Again in his words, “Brand people have been able to convince people to pay more for beer.”
But operational efficiency alone is not going to win market share. Corporate frugality does not eliminate the occasional “big bet.” In fact, Mr. Brito would say it is because of its frugal and efficient culture that it can make the “big bet.” The “big bet” was a heavy investment in the World Cup (August 2010). AB-InBev increased its spending on sales and marketing by 10 percent. In the words of the company, “Budweiser activated the FIFA World Cup asset for the seventh time.”
Sales of Budweiser at the games outpaced soft drinks, sports drinks, and bottled water combined. But it was not South African sales that mattered to AB-InBev—it was the television exposure in the company’s three largest markets: Europe, Brazil, and the United States. Sales were up 2.1 percent in the quarter. This may not seem like a huge difference, but in the terrible economic environment of 2010 it was a huge victory.
This was a “measured big bet,” that is, it was a calculated move by Mr. Brito, not an impulsive one.

QUESTIONS
1. How may individual differences help you understand the approaches of Brito and Dick Yuengling?

2. What may be the implications of these two approaches for other organizations?

3. Will Bud be revived in the U.S.? Will Yuengling successfully expand beyond the East Coast? What could happen in the industry that might make Yuegling’s expansion come too late?