Consider a 2 player game in which player 1 can choose A or B. The game ends if she chooses A, while it continues to player 2 if he chooses B. Player 2 can then choose C or D with the game ending if C is chosen, and continuing again to player 1 if D is chosen. Player 1 can then choose E or F, with the game ending either choice. 

a. Model this as an extensive form game. 

b. How many pure strategies does each player have? 

c. Identity the subgames of this game. 

d. Suppose that choice A gives utilities (2, 0) (i.e., 2 to player A, 0 to player E), choice C gives (3, 1), choice E gives (0, 0), and F gives (1, 2). Then what are the pure Nash equilibria of the game? What SPNE outcome(s) do you obtain through backwards induction?