Civil Procedure Cases And Materials 11th Edition Jack Friedenthal, Arthur Miller, John Sexton, Helen Hershkoff - Solutions

2. Is a district court limited in its transfer analysis to the specified factors of party and witness convenience, or is the “interest of justice” factor a separate consideration that embraces a range of private and public interests? Courts generally follow the broader reading of the statute
1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), as amended in 2012, abrogate Hoffman v. Blaski or only limit its application?
9. Some federal statutes contain special venue rules for where a civil action may be brought. An example may be found in 42 U.S.C. § 2005e-5(f)(3), which defines the venue for an action under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Such actions may be brought:in any judicial district in the
8. In a lawsuit with multiple parties or multiple claims, does the federal court have discretion to apply a doctrine of “pendent venue”? Commentators explain that under this doctrine, venue would “be proper so long as otherwise improperly venued claims are joined with a properly-venued claim
7. Recall that many state venue rules incorporate a “local action” doctrine for lawsuits involving property. In LIVINGSTON v. JEFFERSON, 15 F. Cas. 660 (C.C.D. Va. 1811), Chief Justice Marshall, sitting as a Circuit Judge, recognized the local action doctrine in the federal courts. “[A]ctions
6. How should substantiality be determined under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2)? What approach did the Batescourt take? When applying the substantiality requirement under the pre-2012 version of the federal venue statute, the circuits generally disagreed on whether to look only at defendant’s activities
5. What is the test under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(2) to determine the residence of an entity?Is the test the same whether the entity is incorporated or unincorporated? Notice that the definition distinguishes between plaintiff-entities and defendant-entities. In what respect does the definition of an
4. What is the residence for venue purposes of a non-United States citizen who is not lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States? See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(3).Does the same definition apply to a United States citizen domiciled in a foreign country?
3. What is a natural person’s residence for venue purposes? See 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). Is this definition the same as for citizenship under 28 U.S.C. § 1332? Does it apply to aliens who are residing in the United States?
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), unlike earlier versions of the federal venue statute, sets a unitary venue rule for diversity and federal question cases. Venue in both categories may be based on two criteria: defendant’s residence, if all defendants reside in the same state; and the location of the
1. Federal venue rules underwent significant revision in 1990, followed by additional reforms in 1992 and 1995, and then again pursuant to the Jurisdiction and Venue Clarification Act of 2011. Does the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1390(a) limit venue to a single geographic location or does it
8. In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 118 S.Ct. 523, 139 L.Ed.2d 525 (1997), the Supreme Court clarified that supplemental jurisdiction may be exercised in cases removed to federal court. See Steinman, Crosscurrents: Supplemental Jurisdiction, Removal, and the
7. Consider how the following situations will affect removal:(a) After removal, plaintiff amends her complaint to ask for less than the amount-incontroversy requirement. See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S.283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938).349(b) The complaint seeks
6. How is the amount in controversy determined for removal on grounds of diversity of citizenship? See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(c)(2). Under what circumstances may defendant assert a different amount in controversy to support removal? See id. at § 1446(c)(2)(a)(i)–(ii). What evidentiary standard is
5. The Rose case, p. 281, supra, illustrates plaintiff’s effort to block removal by joining nondiverse parties. Under the doctrine of fraudulent joinder, removal is permitted if plaintiff has no cause of action against the nondiverse defendant; in this situation, the district court may sever the
4. An important limitation on the removal of a diversity action is the ban on removal by an in-state defendant. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). In a multi-defendant action, does the presence of even one in-state defendant block removal? In LIVELY v. WILD OATS MARKETS, INC., 456 F.3d 933 (9th Cir. 2006),
3. Just as plaintiff cannot create federal jurisdiction by anticipating defendant’s responses, so plaintiff cannot block removal by disguising the federal nature of his claim.In BRIGHT v. BECHTEL PETROLEUM, INC., 780 F.2d 766 (9th Cir. 1986), plaintiff sued in state court alleging his employer
2. Defendant’s pleading of a federal affirmative defense to a state law claim generally does not support removal. An important but complex exception involves the doctrine of complete preemption, when state claims are so exclusively federal in nature as to extinguish any state cause of action and
1. In Shamrock, defendant could have filed his federal counterclaim as an independent action in federal court, yet plaintiff functionally in the position of defendant to the counterclaim could not remove the action to federal court. Is this limitation on removal constitutionally grounded? Is it
3. The principal case was overruled on other grounds by California Dept. of Water Resources v. Powerex Corp., 533 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2008), holding that a district court’s discretionary decision to decline supplemental jurisdiction may be challenged by appeal, rather than a petition for writ of
2. May a district court retain supplemental jurisdiction even after the federal claims are dismissed? Consider the following situations:(a) The federal claims are dismissed after extensive discovery, the discovery record is closed, and the summary judgment record is complete. See Redondo
1. The circuits remain divided on when supplemental jurisdiction may be declined under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). One approach, illustrated by the Ninth Circuit in the principal case, is that the statute displaced the Gibbs factors and narrowed the district court’s scope of discretion. Do you agree
3. The legislative history to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b)indicates the intent to prohibit supplemental jurisdiction when its exercise would circumvent traditional330limitations on the grant of diversity jurisdiction. Given the text and history to the statute, explain whether supplemental jurisdiction is
2. What is the significance of the statute’s use of the words “so related” and its omission of the Gibbslanguage referring to a “common nucleus of fact”? See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Based on this linguistic difference, it has been argued that “the constitutional test for supplemental
1. Does 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) codify the Gibbs test for determining when two claims “form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution”? Is it clear that if two claims derive from a “common nucleus of operative fact” they satisfy the statutory test
3. In FINLEY v. UNITED STATES, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593 (1989), plaintiff’s husband and two of her children were killed when their plane struck electric power lines on its approach to a city-run airfield in San Diego, California. Plaintiff alleged that the Federal Aviation
2. In OWEN EQUIPMENT & ERECTION CO. v. KROGER, 437 U.S. 365, 98 S.Ct. 2396, 57 L.Ed.2d 274 (1978), Kroger, a citizen of Iowa, brought a diversity action in Nebraska against Omaha Public Power District (OPPD), a Nebraska corporation, for the wrongful death of her husband, who was electrocuted when
1. In ALDINGER v. HOWARD, 427 U.S. 1, 96 S.Ct. 2413, 49 L.Ed.2d 276 (1976), a Washington State citizen brought a federal civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several state officials; jurisdiction was invoked under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). Plaintiff sought to join Spokane County,
4. Does the Gibbs rationale for pendent jurisdiction justify an analogous doctrine of“pendent” personal jurisdiction, for example, in a suit in which defendant is amenable to jurisdiction pursuant to a federal statute allowing for nationwide service of process, but personal jurisdiction cannot
3. What are the policy justifications for pendent and ancillary jurisdiction? Commentary points to at least two purposes:First, it ensures that litigants will not be dissuaded from maintaining their federal rights in a federal court solely because they can dispose of all claims by one litigation in
2. What is the constitutional and statutory basis for the jurisdiction recognized in Hurn and in Gibbs? Recall that the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1331 is virtually identical to that of Article III. Is the term “civil action” that appears in the statute coextensive with the Constitution’s use
1. In Hurn, discussed in Gibbs, the Court permitted a district court with original jurisdiction over a federal claim to exercise pendent jurisdiction over a state law claim when the two claims presented a “single cause of action” but not if they were “separate and distinct causes of
7. In MIMS v. ARROW FINANCIAL SERVICES, LLC., 565 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. 740, 181 L.Ed.2d 881 (2012), the Supreme Court resolved that Congress’s grant of jurisdiction to state courts to hear disputes arising under the federal Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, regulating telemarketing, did
5. It has been argued that the search for “a single, all-purpose, neutral analytical concept which marks out federal question jurisdiction” is futile. See Cohen, The Broken Compass: The Requirement that a Case Arise “Directly” Under Federal Law, 115 U. Pa. L. Rev. 890 (1967).Instead,
4. Commentators anticipated that Grable’s multifactor test would be more permissive than Merrell Dow or American Well Works in extending a federal forum to state law hybrid claims. However, a study reports that in the three-year period following the decision, “district courts have denied
3. How does Gunn v. Minton clarify when an interest is substantial for purposes of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331? Does this distinction explain why jurisdiction was found to be present in Grable but not in Empire Healthchoice? Does it support the analysis in T.B.Harms Co. v. Eliscu, p. 299,
2. The dissent in Empire Healthchoice emphasized the role of federal common law in resolving the carrier’s reimbursement claim. The topic of federal common law is a complex one and is taken up in Chapter 6, infra.
1. What is the test for jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 after Grable, Empire Healthchoice, and Gunn? Do these opinions incorporate the earlier tests from Mottley, Smith, and Moore, or do they abrogate the earlier decisions?
5. In MERRELL DOW PHARMACEUTICALS INC. v. THOMPSON, 478 U.S. 804, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986), plaintiff sued a drug manufacturer in state court on a number of state law claims including per se negligence, on the theory that defendant had failed to comply with labeling requirements under
4. In MOORE v. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY CO., 291 U.S. 205, 54 S.Ct. 402, 78 L.Ed. 755 (1934), plaintiff brought an action under Kentucky’s Employer Liability Act, which barred an affirmative defense for contributory negligence or assumption of risk if defendant failed to meet state or federal
3. Should all causes of action created by state law be outside 28 U.S.C. § 1331? In SMITH v. KANSAS CITY TITLE & TRUST CO., 255 U.S. 180, 41 S.Ct. 243, 65 L.Ed. 577 (1921), a shareholder sued to enjoin the Trust Company, a Missouri corporation, from investing in certain federal bonds on the ground
2. Should all causes of action created by federal law confer federal question jurisdiction? SHOSHONE MINING CO. v. RUTTER, 177 U.S. 505, 20 S.Ct. 726, 44 L.Ed.864 (1900) involved a federal statute establishing a system allowing miners to resolve conflicting claims to land patents. The federal
1. AMERICAN WELL WORKS CO. v. LAYNE & BOWLER CO., 241 U.S. 257, 36 S.Ct.585, 60 L.Ed. 987 (1916), involved a claim by a pump manufacturer that a competitor had damaged its reputation by telling customers that plaintiff’s pump infringed defendant’s patent. The Supreme Court held that there was
2. Areas in which Congress has given the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction include, inter alia, certain securities-law class actions, 15 U.S.C. § 77p(b) and (c); bankruptcy, 28 U.S.C. § 1334; patents and copyrights, 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a); actions against foreign consuls and vice-consuls, 28
1. Would a congressional statute conferring federal jurisdiction over a case like Harms be constitutional under Osborn’s ingredient test?
5. The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, allows the federal court to issue a declaration of “rights and other legal relations” to an “interested party” in “a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction.” Can a party wanting to litigate in federal court create
4. Under Mottley, plaintiff has the burden of alleging the federal issue as an element of her claim; if the federal issue is assigned to defendant as an affirmative defense, federal jurisdiction cannot be asserted. Why was federal jurisdiction not present on the face of the Mottley’s complaint?
3. Following the Court’s decision, the Mottleys commenced an action in a Kentucky state court. The case ultimately was brought to the United States Supreme Court by appeal from the highest court in Kentucky on the question of the validity and construction of the 1906 Act; three years after the
2. After the Civil War, the number of lawsuits filed in the federal courts dramatically increased, but Congress was slow to increase judicial capacity or to meet the problems of court congestion. See Purcell, Jr.,Reconsidering the Frankfurterian Paradigm: Reflections on Histories of Lower Federal
1. Some commentators question the Court’s interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1331, pointing to the statute’s legislative history. See Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 5.2 (6th ed. 2011)(quoting the floor manager of the statute as saying the bill “gives precisely the power which the
3. The concept of “protective jurisdiction” draws from Osborn’s broad interpretation of Article III and allows a federal court, in the absence of diversity of citizenship, “to hear state law claims, even though the claims themselves neither incorporate an original federal ingredient nor
2. In VERLINDEN B.V. v. CENTRAL BANK OF NIGERIA, 461 U.S. 480, 103 S.Ct. 1962, 76 L.Ed.2d 81 (1983), the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, observed that Osborn“reflects a broad conception of ‘arising under’ jurisdiction, according to which Congress may
1. The contract case discussed in Osborn was presented by the companion case of BANK OF THE UNITED STATES v. PLANTERS’ BANK OFGEORGIA, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904, 6 L.Ed. 244 (1824). The Bank of the United States had purchased notes issued by a state bank, which refused to honor them. The Bank of the
3. The question of how to value non-damages relief such as a declaratory judgment or injunction has divided the courts of appeal. See McInnis, The$75,000.01 Question: What is the Value of Injunctive Relief?, 6 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 1013 (1998). The majority rule is that the jurisdictional amount is
2. Is it so clear that the amount in controversy in the principal case did not meet the statutory condition? When the validity of an insurance policy is in dispute, should the facevalue of the policy be the proper measure of the value of the dispute? See Hawkins v. Aid Assoc. for Lutherans, 338
1. Plaintiffs in the principal case asked for costs and interest, in addition to declaratory relief. Why didn’t the dollar value of that request supply the missing penny?
6. Federal Rule 23 permits a plaintiff to sue on behalf of a class of similarly situated persons and to represent the interests of all members of the class. For a discussion of the amount-in-controversy requirement in this situation and under the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, see pp. 792 795,
5. Consider whether the amount-in-controversy requirement is met in the following cases and whether you need additional information to answer the questions:(a) One plaintiff sues one defendant, claiming $40,000 in property damage and $45,000 for personal injury resulting from the same accident.(b)
4. The Federal Rules authorize the joinder of multiple parties and multiple claims in a single lawsuit. See Chapter 9, infra. Many joinder variations are possible. For example, a single plaintiff may wish to file multiple claims against a single defendant, or multiple plaintiffs may wish to file
3. Is diversity jurisdiction lost if plaintiff’s recovery turns out to be less than the amountin-controversy requirement? See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(b). Should events that take place after the filing of the complaint ever be relevant to the jurisdictional inquiry? Might some post-filing events suggest
2. The party invoking diversity jurisdiction has the burden of showing that the amountin-controversy requirement is met. In meeting this burden, the Supreme Court has established a rule that “the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear
1. Article III does not impose an amount-in-controversy requirement on the grant of diversity jurisdiction. However, the limitation has existed since 1789, when the amount was set at a sum that “exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred dollars.” First Judiciary Act of 1789,
5. In ROSE v. GIAMATTI, 721 F.Supp. 906 (S.D. Ohio 1989), Pete Rose, the manager of the Cincinnati Reds baseball team, filed a state court action to enjoin the Commissioner of Baseball from investigating whether Rose had wagered on ball games in violation of the Rules of Major League Baseball. Rose
4. Does 28 U.S.C. § 1359 prevent using assignment to destroy diversity of citizenship, and so to block defendant’s removal of an action from state to federal court? The Fifth Circuit has held that “[b]ecause of their similarity, assignments which destroy diversity and assignments which create
3. In KRAMER v. CARIBBEAN MILLS, INC., 394 U.S. 823, 89 S.Ct. 1487, 23 L.Ed.2d 9(1969), a Panamanian corporation assigned its interest under a contract with a Haitian corporation to Kramer, a Texas attorney, for $1. By a separate agreement, Kramer reassigned ninety-five percent of any net recovery
2. Under the current version of 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a), can a district court exercise jurisdiction if a permanent resident alien who is domiciled in New York sues two defendants, one of whom is a United States citizen domiciled in Minnesota and the other is a French citizen? Does Article III support
1. Why would treating a permanent resident alien as a state citizen and allowing her to sue another permanent resident alien who is treated as a citizen of a different state raise a constitutional problem?
13. Should a “stateless” person meaning an individual who is not a citizen of any country be eligible to invoke alienage jurisdiction? In BLAIRHOLDINGS CORP. v.RUBINSTEIN, 133 F.Supp. 496 (S.D.N.Y.1955), defendant,278Serge Rubinstein, held a“Nansen” passport issued after World War I by the
12. A “dual national” is a citizen of the United States as well as a citizen of a foreign country. In SADAT v. MERTES, 615 F.2d 1176 (7th Cir. 1980), the Court of Appeals considered whether alienage jurisdiction could be invoked by a litigant who was a citizen of Egypt and a naturalized citizen
11. In JPMORGAN CHASE BANK v. TRAFFIC STREAM (BVI) INFRASTRUCTURE LIMITED, 536 U.S. 88, 122 S.Ct. 2054, 153 L.Ed.2d 95 (2002), the Supreme Court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Souter, held that a corporation in the British Virgin Islands was a citizen or subject of the United Kingdom, despite
10. How do the requirements of diversity jurisdiction differ from those of alienage jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(2), (3), and (4)? Test your reading of the statute by explaining whether alienage jurisdiction, diversity jurisdiction, or no federal jurisdiction is present in the
9. In a direct-action case, plaintiff sues the insurance company without naming the insured party whose wrongdoing gave rise to the claim. How does the citizenship rule for insurers in direct-action cases differ from those that apply to legal representatives in probate cases? See 28 U.S.C. § 1332
8. Some individuals or entities can appear in court only through a legal representative.Examples include a decedent’s estate, an infant, and a person who lacks mental competence.In 1988 Congress amended 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in response to the problem of “manufactured diversity” when a
7. Unincorporated associations include organizations such as partnerships, charitable organizations, and trade unions. Under the general diversity rules, unincorporated associations are not treated as an entity but rather take on the citizenship of all of the association’s members. See Carden v.
6. Special rules govern the citizenship of a bank chartered under federal law so-called“national banks.” 28 U.S.C. § 1348 provides that national banks are “deemed citizens of the States in which they are respectively located.” How does this definition differ from the general rule for
5. Like a natural person, a corporation is treated as an entity for purposes of determining citizenship; unlike a natural person, a corporation may275have multiple states of citizenship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). A corporation is a citizen “of every State and foreign state” in which it is
4. The party invoking diversity jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence. What factors ought the court to consider in assessing whether plaintiff and defendant are citizens of different states? The inquiry’s fact-intensive nature is illustrated by CONNECTU LLC v.ZUCKERBERG, 482
3. Can a United States citizen who is domiciled abroad invoke diversity jurisdiction?See Cresswell v. Sullivan & Cromwell, 922 F.2d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 1990).
2. The Mas court equated state citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction with domicile, but distinguished domicile from residence. If the goal of diversity jurisdiction is to protect out-of-staters from bias in suits against in-staters, does it make sense to disregard residence in defining
1. In DRED SCOTT v. SANDFORD, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 15 L.Ed. 691 (1856), the Supreme Court held that persons descended from African slaves, even if born free, were excluded from United States citizenship and could not invoke diversity jurisdiction.See Krauss, New Evidence that Dred Scott Was Wrong
8. If a state court can hear a case arising under federal law, must it do so? In HOWLETT v. ROSE, 496 U.S. 356, 110 S.Ct. 2430, 110 L.Ed.2d 332 (1990), a unanimous Supreme Court held that the Florida court could not invoke sovereign immunity as a ground for declining to hear a federal civil rights
7. When Congress enacts a federal statute, the presumption is that both the federal and the state courts have competence to enforce the law. This presumption of concurrent jurisdiction is rooted in a “system of dual sovereignty”:This deeply rooted presumption in favor of concurrent state court
6. State courts are considered to be courts of general jurisdiction, meaning their power is plenary and inherent; they have authority to hear cases on any subject matter unless they are ousted of such power by state or federal law. A state court of general jurisdiction is permitted and indeed may
5. Is a statute of limitations a jurisdictional bar or a condition of relief? Ordinarily, a party is permitted to waive an objection to the statute of limitations, which is treated as an affirmative defense and not as a jurisdictional requirement. However, in JOHN R. SAND &GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED
4. Another approach to determining whether a statutory condition is jurisdictional is to ask whether it entitles plaintiff to relief. If it does, then the condition likely pertains to the merits and not to jurisdiction. In MORRISON v. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK LTD., 130 S.Ct. 2869, 177 L.Ed.2d 535
3. Is it appropriate to treat a statutory requirement as jurisdictional only when the legislature has designated it as such?
2. What is the significance of characterizing an issue as jurisdictional rather than an element of the cause of action? How did this distinction affect the parties’ procedural opportunities in Lacks?
1. In Lacks, the husband won a judgment of divorce even though he apparently failed to meet the residence requirement of the New York divorce law. Despite this defect, the Court of Appeals refused to allow the wife to vacate the judgment for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Can you explain the
3. How much weight ought to be given to the private interest when the government tows, immobilizes, or destroys an automobile driver’s car? In BENNIS v. MICHIGAN, 516 U.S.442, 116 S.Ct. 994, 134 L.Ed.2d 68 (1996), the state of Michigan forfeited a family’s automobile as a public nuisance,
2. In Doehr, defendant continued to possess and reside in his home after the attachment, but nevertheless was entitled to due process protection. In the wake of Doehr, commentators questioned the constitutionality of lis pendens statutes, which permit a plaintiff who claims an interest in real
1. SHAUMYAN v. O’NEILL, 987 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.1993), involved the same attachment statute at issue in Doehr, but applied in a contract dispute between a homeowner and a contractor hired to do repairs. The homeowner questioned the quality of the repair work, and refused to pay the remainder of the
4. A number of factors recur in the Sniadach-line of cases, including:
3. In MITCHELL v. W.T. GRANT CO., 416 U.S. 600, 94 S.Ct. 1895, 40 L.Ed.2d 406 (1974), the Court upheld a Louisiana sequestration statute permitting the creditor to obtain the writ on an ex parte application without giving the debtor either notice or a prior opportunity for a hearing. The suit
2. In FUENTES v. SHEVIN, 407 U.S. 67, 92 S.Ct. 1983, 32 L.Ed.2d 556, rehearing denied 409 U.S. 902, 93 S.Ct. 177, 34 L.Ed.2d 165 (1972), the Court held, four-to-three, that a state statute authorizing the replevin of consumer goods without a pre-seizure hearing was unconstitutional. The writ of
1. In SNIADACH v. FAMILY FINANCE CORP. OF BAY VIEW, 395 U.S. 337, 89 S.Ct.1820, 23 L.Ed.2d 349 (1969), the Court struck down the Wisconsin wage garnishment procedure as violative of due process. The statute authorized a summons to issue at the request of the creditor’s lawyer; service on the
2. Federal law grants immunity from service of process to certain representatives of foreign governments, their families, and members of their households. The scope of the immunity was at issue in KADIC v. KARADZIC, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995), an action by Croat and Muslim human rights victims
1. In LAMB v. SCHMITT, 285 U.S. 222, 52 S.Ct. 317, 76 L.Ed. 720 (1932), Justice Stone explained the traditional rule of immunity from process:The present suit was brought by the respondent here, the receiver appointed by the decree in the first one. It seeks the recovery of a part of the funds
4. New forms of technology continue to affect the forms of process that are considered permissible. In FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION v. PCCARE247 INC., 2013 WL 841037(S.D.N.Y. 2013), service of process upon defendants located in India was permitted through email and Facebook. Defendants were alleged to
3. Rule 4(f)(3) authorizes forms of service “by other means not prohibited by international agreement, as the court orders.” Service of process under Rule 4(f)(3) is neither a “last resort”nor considered to be “extraordinary relief”; this form of service is not to be “disfavored.”
2. Rule 4(f)(2) permits service that is “reasonably calculated to give notice,” and specifies, for example, that service may be effected in conformance with the foreign country’s law.

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Civil Procedure Cases And Materials 11th Edition Jack Friedenthal, Arthur Miller, John Sexton, Helen Hershkoff - Solutions

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