In 2017, the 737 MAX entered service. Since then, 346 people died in two 737 MAX crashes:

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“In 2017, the 737 MAX entered service. Since then, 346 people died in two 737 MAX crashes: a Lion Air plane crashed on October 29, 2018, after taking off in Indonesia (189 died); and an Ethiopian Airlines plane crashed after taking off in Ethiopia on March 10, 2019 (157 died)”(USA Today, 2020). American Airlines started training its pilots to fly the refurbished aircraft during the first half of 2021; other European carriers are to follow. All aboard? 


Background

The Boeing Company has been recognized for its reputation as one of the world’s largest firms in the aerospace industry. Present in over 150 countries, Boeing has been able to forge its path through the production of passenger and military aircrafts, defense products, space capsules, rockets, security systems, and more (Boeing, 2019). However, March 10, 2019, was a dark day in the company’s history. Only a few moments after takeoff, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 crashed, killing all 157 passengers on board. This was the second deadly crash of a Boeing aircraft in a short period of only five months, after Lion Air Flight 610 crashed into the Java Sea in October 2018. The aircraft went down 13 minutes after takeoff and only 5,200 feet of ascent, having reported an unknown control issue two minutes into the flight (Wright and Karmini, 2018). Both aircrafts were Boeing 737 MAX 8 jets.


Brief History

The market in which the Boeing 737 line of aircraft operated was one considered to be “large but narrow.” The Boeing 737 and its main competitor, the Airbus A320, comprised about half of the 28,000 commercial airlines in the world (Campbell, 2019). The two companies were married in a quest to stay both cheap and competitive. In an effort to cut costs, the two manufacturers focused on fuel efficiency and ways to “squeeze” even as small as one percentage point of efficiency wherever possible. In 2010, Airbus leveled the playing field, releasing a “new and improved” version of the A320: the A320neo would save airlines thousands of dollars in fuel (Campbell, 2019). Boeing considered taking the financial hit and selling its 737s at a discounted price, as the company was working on designing an entirely new plane. However, after talking with some of its major consumers such as American Airlines, Boeing realized customers would not wait.

Boeing struggled to keep a tight grip on Airbus’s new release. To stay relevant and prevent loss of market share, Boeing redesigned its 737 aircraft. Not only was Boeing redesigning the aircraft, but initial plans required getting to market under a strict time schedule of six years (Campbell, 2019). The company based the newest model, the MAX line, off of existing 737 models, which, at the time, were nearly 50 years old. To maintain the Type Certificate issued by the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), which approves planes for flight, Boeing had to redesign the plane to be “cutting edge” but continue to maintain the integrity and “feel and fly” of the original 737 aircrafts from the 1960s (Campbell, 2019). This required engineers to mount the larger, more powerful engine further up on the wing, unlike engines that originally were built for this type of plane. With this alteration, the aerodynamics were also changed and, depending on the situation, the nose of the aircraft could be pushed upward, causing the plane to crash (BBC News, 2019). Staying within the original blueprints would not have jeopardized the certification process.

According to internal document released after the crashes, Boeing employees criticized this move and doubted the plane’s ability to fly safely. Some even said that the airplane was “designed by clowns, who in turn are supervised by monkeys” and that the plane had “piss poor design” (Isidore and Levitt, 2020). The MAX line received its Type Certification approximately 5.5 years into the project (Campbell, 2019). Shortly after, pilots began boasting about their ability to fly the aircraft with only two and a half hours of online training and with no simulation testing whatsoever (Campbell, 2019).

At the time of the crisis, the 737 MAX was Boeing’s most recently released line of aircraft, one that bolstered Boeing’s reputation, contributing to it becoming the fastest-selling aircraft in history with 5,000 orders to over 100 customers across the globe (Boeing, 2019). As a single-aisle jet, it was designed “to offer the greatest flexibility, reliability, and efficiency in the single-aisle market” (Boeing, 2019).” The MAX 8 seats a maximum of 210 passengers, is over 129 feet long, and has a wingspan of 117 feet. The aircraft was operated by over 65 popular airlines, including United Airlines, Southwest Airlines, and American Airlines (Boeing, 2019). Currently, there are approximately 7,300 early versions of the MAX, and almost 20 percent of those are parked (Isidore, 2020).

 

The Crisis

On October 28, 2019, just one day before the first deadly crash of a 737 MAX 8 jet, an off-duty pilot jumped into action aboard a Lion Air flight to help pilots control a nosedive, believed to have been caused by a “malfunctioning flightcontrol system” (Chicago Tribune, 2019).” This would later be attributed to the MCAS system. Neither the flight manual nor MAX training informed pilots of this stabilization system (Isidore and Levitt, 2020). The first officer and pilot spent the first 15 minutes of flight battling nosedive after nosedive, referencing the aircraft’s “quick reference guide” meant for “non-normal” situations, to no avail (Campbell, 2019). The off-duty pilot, who was simply catching a ride to his next shift, offered a suggestion that allowed the pilots to regain control and safely land the aircraft (Campbell, 2019). Per standard procedure, the incident was reported to the airline, followed by an investigation. After inspectors checked the aircraft for major equipment failures, the search revealed no findings, and the aircraft was cleared for flight (Campbell, 2019). This was the same aircraft that went down several minutes post-takeoff the following day, after 28 failed attempts to pull out of recurring nosedives, killing everyone on board.

The Crisis On October 28, 2019, just one day before the first deadly crash of a 737 MAX 8 jet, an off-duty pilot jumped into action aboard a Lion Air flight to help pilots control a nosedive, believed to have been caused by a “malfunctioning flightcontrol system” (Chicago Tribune, 2019).” This would later be attributed to the MCAS system. Neither the flight manual nor MAX training informed pilots of this stabilization system (Isidore and Levitt, 2020). The first officer and pilot spent the first 15 minutes of flight battling nosedive after nosedive, referencing the aircraft’s “quick reference guide” meant for “non-normal” situations, to no avail (Campbell, 2019). The off-duty pilot, who was simply catching a ride to his next shift, offered a suggestion that allowed the pilots to regain control and safely land the aircraft (Campbell, 2019). Per standard procedure, the incident was reported to the airline, followed by an investigation. After inspectors checked the aircraft for major equipment failures, the search revealed no findings, and the aircraft was cleared for flight (Campbell, 2019). This was the same aircraft that went down several minutes post-takeoff the following day, after 28 failed attempts to pull out of recurring nosedives, killing everyone on board....


Questions for Discussion

1. What went wrong with the Boeing 737?

2. Who was at fault, when, and why?

3. What are the ethical concerns in the case?

4. Present an argument on Boeing’s behalf, justifying the return of the 737 to service; then present an argument against returning the plane to service.

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