The plaintiff, Aliaga Medical Center (“Aliaga”), opened a business checking account with Harris Bank on two occasions. On both occasions, Aliaga received the “Harris Bank Handbook for Personal and Business Deposit Accounts.” On both occasions, Aliaga acknowledged receipt of the agreement, confirming that he agreed to the Terms of Agreement of opening an account at Harris Bank.
On July 10, 2010, Dr. Frederico Aliaga, the president of Aliaga Medical Center, issued a check from the business checking account at Harris Bank in the amount of $50,000.00, with the words “void after 90 days” printed above the signature line, payable to Dr. Aliaga’s soon-to-be ex-wife. On December 10, 2010, Harris Bank honored the check. One month later, Harris Bank issued the December 10 bank statement, which showed that Harris Bank had honored the check to Dr. Aliaga’s ex-wife.
In October 2012, Aliaga disputed the check. The trial court dismissed the complaint and Aliaga appealed.
JUDGE DELORT Aliaga does not dispute the applicability of the various contractual provisions on which Harris relies, but argues that the use of the printed word “void” on the check and the passage of time somehow took it outside the scope of the account agreement. We disagree. Like the proverbial bird that is identified as a duck because of its distinctive characteristics, the document in question was a check. It was in the standard form of a check, contained standard check language, bore the bank’ s name, routing number and the account number set in electronically readable magnetic ink character recognition (MICR) type, and was otherwise was presented, paid, and accounted for as a check in the normal course of the account’s regular operation. We cannot agree with Aliaga’s characterization, as it would create unworkable burdens on financial institutions in this era of ubiquitous electronic check processing. The agreement between the parties governs.
Harris had the right to pay the check despite the “void after 90 days” language because Aliaga failed to properly stop payment of the check. Under the parties’
agreement, if Aliaga did not want Harris Bank to pay a check it had written, then Aliaga had to comply with certain requirements. In particular, Aliaga must order Harris Bank either in person, online, or in writing to stop payment of a check by including an “account number, the number and date of the check, the name of the payee, and the amount” by a certain deadline and must also pay a stop payment fee. Here, Aliaga acknowledges that it did not comply with the stop payment provisions of the agreement. Without the required stop payment order, Harris Bank maintained its right to honor the check. Therefore, the check’s “void”
language did not suffice to stop payment because the agreement contains no exception for such language on checks.
Aliaga’s contention that it was not required to comply with the stop payment terms of the parties’ agreement is without merit. Aliaga claims that under a UCC provision (810 ILCS 5/4-403(a)(West 2012)), it was only required to stop payment “in a time and manner that gives the bank a reasonable opportunity to comply” and that its notation on the check “certainly achieves this.” However, Aliaga’s contention is without merit for several reasons. First, the UCC permits that “[t]he effect of [its] provisions may be varied by agreement.” 810 ILCS 5/4-103

(a) (West 2012). Here, the parties entered into an agreement, which included specific notice and fee requirements for stopping payment of a check. Those agreed-upon requirements superseded the UCC provision in question.
Furthermore, under the parties’ agreement, Harris Bank specifically “reserve[d] the right to pay a stale check.” Aliaga’s contention that this provision is inapplicable because the check “was not stale [but instead] it was void” is without merit. (Emphasis in original.) The effect of a bank customer writing “void after 90 days” on a check has been described as making the check stale after the initial 90-day period. Aliaga has not cited to any case nor identified any other authority supporting its proposition that there is a substantive difference between stale checks and those marked void after a certain time…. Accordingly, we hold that, under the terms of the stop payment provision of the parties’ agreement, Harris Bank appropriately paid the check.
Aliaga cannot circumvent the clear and unambiguous terms of its agreement with Harris Bank that it “must notify [Harris Bank] of account problem[s], including an erroneous statement entry or improper charges within 60 days of the date [Harris Bank] send[s] or make[s] [Aliaga’s] statement available to [it],”
page 690 and “[Harris Bank] shall not be liable for errors unless [Aliaga] [has] given [Harris Bank] the required notice.” The alleged unauthorized payment of the check was reflected on the December 2010 statement, which plainly fell within the province of an “account problem,” “erroneous statement entry,” “improper charge[],” and “error” contained within the agreement’s provision. Accordingly, Aliaga cannot claim Harris Bank’s decision to honor the check was erroneous, given its own failure to comply with the 60-day notice provision set forth in the parties’ agreement.
CRITICAL THINKING:
What evidence does the judge rely on to come to the conclusion that the bank was not liable? Do you think the judge ignores any important evidence? Is there any missing information that would help you come to a conclusion regarding the bank’s liability?
ETHICAL DECISION MAKING:
Do you think the values promoted by the decision are appropriate for the situation? Why or why not?