Plaintiff David Krasner brings this action against his former employer, HSH Nordbank AG (“HSH”), and his supervisor while employed there, Roland Kiser, alleging [among other things]

sexual discrimination * * * in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.b

* * * *

Defendant HSH is an international commercial bank, headquartered in Germany, and has offi ces worldwide, including a branch in New York City.

There, Krasner alleges, he encountered an atmosphere infected with overt sexism, where career

“advancement based on sexual favoritism” was accepted, and where male supervisors promoted a sexist and demeaning image of women in the workplace in which women’s advancement was governed by a

“casting couch.” * * * Kiser also pressured male subordinates, such as Krasner, to go to strip clubs with him when on business trips abroad.

* * * *

* * * The primary offender in Krasner’s estimation is Kiser, and what takes center stage in the complaint are allegations of a relationship between Kiser and a woman named Melissa Campfi eld * * * .

Kiser, it is alleged, “advance[ed] and promot[ed]” Campfi eld’s career “at the expense of the career advancement and reputations of other far more senior and qualifi ed employees,”

Krasner included.

* * * *

* * * On September 6, 2007, Krasner lodged a verbal, in-person complaint with * * * the Head of Human Resources, articulating his belief that “Kiser was violating

[HSH’s] ethics policy by creating a personal confl ict of interest” and generally “creating an unprofessional environment.”

* * * *

* * * On September 19, Krasner again turned to the Human Resources department, this time with a written complaint, reiterating his belief that Kiser was violating the company’s ethics policy and creating an unprofessional environment through his relationship with Campfi eld.

* * * *

On October 3, HSH concluded its internal investigation of Krasner’s complaints and found no violation of law or internal ethics policy. A month later, on November 5, 2007, Krasner was summarily terminated

* * * .

Krasner subsequently sought and received a right to sue letter from the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) and thereafter commenced this lawsuit * * * .

Defendants—HSH and Kiser—move to dismiss.

* * * *

The substantive antidiscrimination provision of Title VII prohibits employers from

“discriminat[ing] against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual’s * * * sex. One form of gender discrimination prohibited by Title VII is sexual harassment that results in a ‘hostile or abusive work environment.’ ” Under this doctrine, even if an “employee does not experience a specifi c negative action,” he may have a viable claim under Title VII for sexual discrimination where

“the harassment is so pervasive that it changes the conditions of employment.”

[Emphasis added.]

* * * *

Krasner’s discrimination claim is founded on allegations that he was subject to a sexually hostile work environment through a combination of “(1) widespread sexual favoritism resulting from Kiser’s affair with Campfi eld; (2) widespread sexual favoritism resulting from other affairs at [HSH]; and (3) sexually harassing and offensive conduct perpetrated by Kiser * * * unrelated to sexual affairs.” In addressing these contentions, the parties argue as though a hostile environment is something that exists in some absolute way, like poisonous chemicals in the air, affecting everyone who comes in contact with it. In doing so, the parties all but ignore the prohibited causal factor requirement, which is critical to liability.

Title VII does not prohibit employers from maintaining nasty, unpleasant workplaces, or even ones that are unpleasant for reasons that are sexual in nature. Rather, it prohibits employers from discriminating against an employee (including by subjecting him or her to hostile working conditions) “because of such individual’s * * * sex.”

* * * *

An examination of Krasner’s allegations reveals that he does not contend that he was disparaged or badly treated or subjected to an unpleasant work atmosphere in any way because he is a man.

Rather, his complaint is primarily that Kiser and other supervisors advanced a demeaning view of women in the workplace, which Krasner was exposed to and found

“objectionable,” and which denied

“him the opportunity to work in an employment setting free of unlawful harassment.”

* * * *

* * * Krasner’s claim fails because “none of the alleged acts of harassment committed directly against [Krasner]”—either when viewed in isolation or in conjunction with any potential discrimination against women—

“support a claim that [he] is being harassed because he is a male employee.”

The primary animator of the complaint is what Krasner terms the “egregious effects of Kiser’s favoritism” towards Campfi eld upon plaintiff himself.

Assuming that these actions

* * * systematically and pervasively altered the conditions of Krasner’s working environment suffi ciently to satisfy the objective component of a hostile environment claim, the claim must nevertheless fail because the complaint does not allege that these incidents are in any way related to his gender. Krasner does not allege, and proffers [presents or offers] no facts that remotely suggest, that a female supervisor in his position would not have experienced exactly the same consequences from Kiser’s preferential treatment of Campfi eld.

* * * *

For the foregoing reasons, defendants’

motions to dismiss the complaint

* * * are granted.

SO ORDERED.

Questions:- 

1. Why did the court conclude that Krasner did not have a valid claim for “hostile environment” discrimination?

2. Suppose that a female employee had experienced the same type of treatment that Krasner had. Would the female employee succeed in a Title VII claim of gender-based discrimination? Why or why not?