Respondents in this case are a law fi rm, Carlisle, McNellie, Rini, Kramer & Ulrich, L.P.A., [Legal Professional Association], and one of its attorneys, Adrienne S. Foster

(collectively Carlisle). In April 2006, Carlisle fi led a complaint in Ohio state court on behalf of a client, Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

Carlisle sought foreclosure of a mortgage held by Countrywide in real property owned by petitioner Karen L. Jerman. The complaint included a “Notice,” later served on Jerman, stating that the mortgage debt would be assumed to be valid unless Jerman disputed it in writing. Jerman’s lawyer sent a letter disputing the debt, and Carlisle sought verifi cation from Countrywide. When Countrywide acknowledged that Jerman had, in fact, already paid the debt in full, Carlisle withdrew the foreclosure lawsuit.

Jerman then fi led her own lawsuit seeking * * * damages under the FDCPA [Fair Debt Collection Practices Act], contending that Carlisle violated [the act]

by stating that her debt would be assumed valid unless she disputed it in writing. While acknowledging a division of authority on the question, the District Court held that Carlisle had violated [the act]

by requiring Jerman to dispute the debt in writing. The court ultimately granted summary judgment to Carlisle, however, concluding that Section 1692k

(c) [of the FDCPA]

shielded it from liability because the violation was not intentional, resulted from a bona fi de error, and occurred despite the maintenance of procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error. The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affi rmed. Acknowledging that the Courts of Appeals are divided regarding the scope of the bona fi de error defense, and that the “majority view is that the defense is available for clerical and factual errors only,”

the Sixth Circuit nonetheless held that Section 1692k

(c) extends to

“mistakes of law.”

* * * *

The parties disagree about whether a “violation” resulting from a debt collector’s misinterpretation of the legal requirements of the FDCPA can ever be “not intentional” under 1692k(c). Jerman contends that when a debt collector intentionally commits the act giving rise to the violation (here, sending a notice that included the “in writing”

language), a misunderstanding about what the Act requires cannot render the violation “not intentional,”

given the general rule that mistake or ignorance of law is no defense. Carlisle and the dissent, in contrast, argue that nothing in the statutory text excludes legal errors from the category of “bona fi de error[s]” covered by 1692k

(c) and note that the Act refers not to an unintentional “act” but rather an unintentional “violation.” The latter term, they contend, evinces [makes clear] Congress’ intent to impose liability only when a party knows its conduct is unlawful. Carlisle urges us, therefore, to read 1692k(c)

to encompass “all types of error,”

including mistakes of law.

We decline to adopt the expansive reading of Section 1692k

(c) that Carlisle proposes. We have long recognized the “common maxim, familiar to all minds, that ignorance of the law will not excuse any person, either civilly or criminally.” Our law is therefore no stranger to the possibility that an act may be “intentional” for purposes of civil liability, even if the actor lacked actual knowledge that her conduct violated the law. [Emphasis added.]

* * * When Congress has intended to provide a mistake-of-law defense to civil liability, it has often done so more explicitly than here.

In particular, the FTC [Federal Trade Commission] Act’s administrativepenalty provisions—which * * *

Congress expressly incorporated into the FDCPA—apply only when a debt collector acts with “actual knowledge or knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances” that its action was

“prohibited by [the FDCPA].” Given the absence of similar language in Section 1692k(c), it is a fair inference that Congress chose to permit injured consumers to recover actual damages, costs, fees, and modest statutory damages for “intentional”

conduct, including violations resulting from mistaken interpretation of the FDCPA, while reserving the more onerous penalties of the FTC Act for debt collectors whose intentional actions also refl ected “knowledge fairly implied on the basis of objective circumstances” that the conduct was prohibited.

* * * *

We draw additional support for the conclusion that bona fi de errors in Section 1692k

(c) do not include mistaken interpretations of the FDCPA from the requirement that a debt collector maintain “procedures reasonably adapted to avoid any such error.” The dictionary defi nes “procedure” as “a series of steps followed in a regular orderly defi nite way.” In that light, the statutory phrase is more naturally read to apply to processes that have mechanical or other such “regular orderly” steps to avoid mistakes—

for instance, the kind of internal controls a debt collector might adopt to ensure its employees do not communicate with consumers at the wrong time of day or make false representations as to the amount of a debt. * * * We do not dispute that some entities may maintain procedures to avoid legal errors. But legal reasoning is not a mechanical or strictly linear process.

For this reason, we fi nd * * * that the broad statutory requirement of procedures reasonably designed to avoid “any” bona fi de error indicates that the relevant procedures are ones that help to avoid errors like clerical or factual mistakes.

Such procedures are more likely to avoid error than those applicable to legal reasoning, particularly in the context of a comprehensive and complex federal statute such as the FDCPA that imposes open-ended prohibitions on, inter alia [among other things], “false, deceptive,” or

“unfair” practices.

* * * *

For the reasons discussed above, the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit is reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Questions:-

1. One of the concerns raised by Carlisle was that if attorneys could be held liable for their reasonable misinterpretations of the FDCPA’s requirements, there would be a “fl ood of lawsuits” against creditors’ attorneys by plaintiffs seeking damages and attorneys’ fees. Should this concern have any bearing on the outcome of this case? Why or why not?

2. Jerman’s attorneys contended that if the Court agreed with Carlisle’s argument (that the bona fi de error defense included errors in legal interpretation), ethical debt collectors would be placed at a disadvantage. Why would this be?