1. Do strikes by public employees result in public employers making extraordinary concessions?
2. State the rule of the case.

[Since 1973, the district and Local 660 have bargained concerning wages, hours, and working conditions pursuant to the Meyers-Milias-Brown Act (MMBA). Each year these negotiations have resulted in a binding labor contract or memorandum of understanding (MOU). On July 5, 1976, approximately 75 percent of the district's employees went out on strike after negotiations between the district and the union for a new wage and benefit agreement reached an impasse and failed to produce a new MOU. The district promptly filed a complaint for injunctive relief and damages and was granted a temporary re straining order. The strike continued for approximately 11 days, during which time the district was able to maintain its facilities and operations through the efforts of management personnel and certain union members who chose not to strike. On July 16, the employees voted to accept a tentative agreement, the terms of which were identical to the district's offer prior to the strike. The district then proceeded with the instant action for tort damages.
The trial court found the strike to be unlawful and in violation of the public policy of the state of California and thus awarded the district $246,904 in compensatory damages, prejudgment interest in the amount of $87,615.22, and costs of $874.65.]
BROUSSARD, J.…
Common law decisions in other jurisdictions at one time held that no employee, whether public or private, had a right to strike in concert with fellow workers. In fact, such collective action was generally viewed as a conspiracy and held subject to both civil and criminal sanctions. Over the course of the 20th century, however, courts and legislatures gradually acted to change these laws as they applied to private-sector employees; today, the right to strike is generally accepted as indispensable to the system of collective bargaining and negotiation, which characterizes labor-management relations in the private sector.
By contrast, American law continues to regard public-sector strikes in a substantially different manner.
A strike by employees of the United States government may still be treated as a crime, and strikes by state and local employees have been explicitly allowed by courts or statute in only ten states.
Contrary to the assertions of the plaintiff as well as various holdings of the Court of Appeal, this Court has repeatedly stated that the legality of strikes by public employees in California has remained an open question….
In sum, there is little, if any empirical evidence which demonstrates that governments generally capitulate to unreasonable demands by public employees in order to resolve strikes. The result of the strike in the instant case clearly suggests the opposite. During the 11-day strike, negotiations resumed, and the parties subsequently reached an agreement on a new MOU, the terms of which were precisely the same
as the District's last offer prior to the commencement of the strike. Such results certainly do not illustrate a situation where public employees wielded excessive bargaining power and thereby caused a distortion of our political process.…
… [We] conclude that the common law prohibition against public-sector strikes should not be recognized in this state. Consequently, strikes by public-sector employees in this state as such are neither illegal nor tortious under California common law. We must immediately caution, however, that the right of public employees to strike is by no means unlimited. Prudence and concern for the general public welfare require certain restrictions….
After consideration of the various alternatives before us, we believe the following standard may properly guide courts in the resolution of future disputes in this area: strikes by public employees are not unlawful at common law unless or until it is clearly demonstrated that such a strike creates a substantial and imminent threat to the health or safety of the public. This standard allows exceptions in certain essential areas of public employment (e.g., the prohibition against firefighters and law enforcement personnel) and also requires the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the public interest overrides the basic right to strike….
As Judge J. Skelly Wright declared in his concurrence in United Federation of Postal Clerks v. Blount, supra, "[i]f the inherent purpose of a labor organization is to bring the workers' interests to bear on management, the right to strike is, historically and practically, an important means of effectuating that purpose. A union that never strikes, or which can make no credible threat to strike, may wither away in ineffectiveness. That fact is not irrelevant to the constitutional calculations. Indeed, in several decisions, the Supreme Court has held that the First Amendment right of association is at least concerned with essential organizational activities which give the particular association life and promote its fundamental purposes … [Citations.] I do not suggest that the right to strike is co-equal with the right to form labor organizations…. But I do believe that the right to strike is, at least, within constitutional concern and should not be discriminatorily abridged without substantial or 'compelling' justification." (325 F. Supp. 879, 885.) …
We conclude that it is not unlawful for public employees to engage in a concerted work stoppage for the purpose of improving their wages or conditions of employment, unless it has been determined that the work stoppage poses an imminent threat to public health or safety. Since the trial court's judgment for damage in this case was predicated upon an erroneous determination that defendants' strike was unlawful, the judgment for damages cannot be sustained.
The judgment is reversed.
[Four of the seven justices adopted the rule of law legalizing strikes. Two others filed a concurring opinion, agreeing with the majority only insofar as it struck down the damage award, concluding that damages should not be awarded for a peaceful public-sector strike regardless of whether the strike is legal or illegal. They contended that the question of the legality of strikes could and should again be side-stepped. One judge, Justice Lucas, dissented, issuing a sharply worded opinion that public employees do not have, nor should they have, a right to strike. He also criticized the majority for attempting to fashion a rule of law outlawing some but not all strikes, preferring to let the California legislature resolve the problem.]