1. [25 points] Consider the following two-player simultaneous game. Does either player have a dominant strategy? If so, which? Does either player have a dominated strategy? If so, which? Find any and all equilibria in this game. Describe how you found that/those equilibria? This game eventually becomes a familiar and famous game that we have studied. Which game does it become? a0 T o 2. [25 points] Consider the following 2-player simultaneous game: a. lllustrate this game and find any subgame perfect equilibria as a sequential game in a game tree (extensive form) where Vincent goes first and Jules goes second. b. Illustrate this game and find any subgame perfect equilibria as a sequential game in a payoff matrix (normal form) where Vincent goes first and Jules goes second. c. lllustrate this game (BUT DO NOT SOLVE IT) as a simultaneous game in a game tree (extensive form). d. Look back at the sequential game from a. lllustrate this sequential game in a payoff matrix (normal form) and find any PURE equilibria