1. Amy and Bert cannot decide where to go to dinner. Amy proposes the following procedure: she will write on a piece of paper either the number 2 or the number 4 or the number 6, while Bert will write on his piece of paper either the number 1 or 3 or 5. They will write their numbers secretly and independently. They then will show each other what they wrote and choose a restaurant according to the following rule: if the sum of the two numbers is 5 or less, they will go to a Malaysian restaurant, if the sum is 7 they will go to an Irish restaurant and if the number is 9 or more they will go to a Flemish restaurant. Suppose that Amy and Bert have the following preferences (where M stands for 'Malaysian', I for 'Irish' and F for 1Flemish'): For Amy ['A'): M >'A I >'A F For Bert (\"B\"): I >'B M >'B F 1.1. Using utility function with values 1, 2 and 3 represent the corresponding strategic form game as a matrix. 1.2. Determine, for each player, whether the player has strictly dominated strategies. 1.3. Determine, for each player, whether the player has weakly dominated strategies. 1.4. Apply the IESDS procedure (Iterated Elimination of Strictly Dominated Strategies). Is there a solution? (in other words: Does the procedure lead to a unique outcome?) 1.5. Apply the IEWDS procedure (Iterated Elimination of Weakly Dominated Strategies). Does it lead to a unique outcome? 1.6. Find the Nash Equilibria of this game